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I. INTRODUCTION

The backbone of an administrative agency's effectiveness is the
ability to investigate rapidly the activities of entities within the
agency's jurisdiction., An agency's ability to carry out its investigative functions depends upon enforcement of the agency's administrative subpoenas.2 Courts have not always looked favorably upon broad
agency subpoena power. 3 The implementation of the New Deal and
the exigencies of World War II created a need for increased administrative oversight of national affairs. Courts began to recognize the
usefulness of proactive administrative government. 4 Concurrent
supreme court decisions reflected this philosophical change by adopting highly deferential views of administrative subpoena enforcement. 5

1.
FederalMaritime Commn. v. Port of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1975).
2.
Id.
3.
See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924) ("Anyone who respects
the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth Amendment would be loath to believe that Congress
intended to authorize one of its subordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions into the fire and
to direct fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime"); Jones v. SecuritiesExchange Commn., 298 U.S. 1, 27 (1936) ("An investigation
not based upon specified grounds is quite as objectionable as a search warrant not based upon
specific statements of fact").
4.
Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 1 AdministrativeLaw Treatise § 4.1 at
141 (Little, Brown, 3d. ed. 1994).
5.
The turning point case was Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
The Court held that so long as an administrative subpoena is not "plainly incompetent or
irrelevant to any lawful purpose" of the agency, the district courts have a duty to order
production of the evidence. Id. at 509. See also Oklahoma PressPublishingCo. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 216 (1946) (stating that a subpoena is enforceable so long as the agency proceeds "with
[the] investigation in accordance with the mandate of Congress and.., the records sought [are)
relevant to that purpose"); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) ("lit is
sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite
and the information sought is reasonably relevant").
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This deference has governed administrative subpoena enforcement for
over fifty years.
Recent decisions, however, have signaled a move away from
the deferential view of administrative subpoena power. 6 In response
to the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s 7 Congress passed the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
Administrative agencies charged with enforcing
("FIRREA").8
FIRREA routinely subpoena the personal financial records of directors
and officers of failed savings and loan associations.9 Attempts to
enforce these subpoenas have proven difficult. Judicial resistance to
this use of the subpoena power rests on two grounds. First, courts
have drawn a distinction between corporate and personal financial
This distinction underlies the holding that fourth
records.
amendment privacy concerns require agencies to demonstrate some
suspicion of wrongdoing in order to subpoena personal financial records. 10 Second, courts have prohibited or curtailed use of the subpoena power to determine the cost-effectiveness of bringing an enforcement action."
Part II of this Note describes the development of broad agency
subpoena power and the recent decisions restricting that power. Part
III analyzes the validity of a distinction between personal and corporate financial records in the context of administrative subpoena enforcement. It also discusses the impact of such a distinction on adSee, for example, Parks v. FDIC, 65 F.3d 207, 214 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the
6.
Fourth Amendment requires an administrative agency to articulate a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing by the target before a court will enforce a subpoena for personal financial records);
RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that subpoenas for personal financial
records issued to determine the cost-effectiveness of bringing an enforcement action are only
enforceable if the agency has an "articulable suspicion" that the party is liable); CFTC v. Collins,
997 F.2d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a subpoena for a target's personal tax records
is only enforceable after balancing the privacy interest in income tax returns and the needs of
law enforcement).
See generally Martin Mayer, The Greatest-EverBank Robbery: The Collapse of the
7.
Savings and Loan Industry (C. Scribner's Sons, 1990).
8.
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989), codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.
(1994 ed.).
See, for example, Parks, 65 F.3d at 208-09; In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1129 (2d Cir.
9.
1995); FDIC v. Wentz, 55 F.3d 905, 907 (3d Cir. 1995); Walde, 18 F.3d at 944. Compare Collins,
997 F.2d at 1231 (invalidating a Commodity Futures Trading Commission subpoena seeking
personal income tax returns to investigate the target's possible motive to violate the Commodity
Exchange Act).
10. See Parks, 65 F.3d at 211; Wentz, 55 F.3d at 908-09.
11. Compare Walde, 18 F.3d at 949 (holding that it is permissible to use subpoena power
to determine the cost-effectiveness of an enforcement action if the agency has an "articulable
suspicion" of wrongdoing by the target), with Freese v. FDIC, 837 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.N.H. 1993)
("A determination of whether the pursuit of a civil suit against the plaintiffs would be cost
effective is not a proper purpose to issue a subpoena").
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ministrative agencies' ability to carry out their regulatory missions
effectively. Part IV focuses on the use of administrative subpoena
power to determine the cost-effectiveness of enforcement actions.
This Part particularly emphasizes the tension between restrictions on
this use of the subpoena power and the judicial deference typically
granted to agency discretion in setting a regulatory agenda.12 Part V
concludes that the restrictions placed on administrative agencies'
power to subpoena personal financial records in recent decisions are
unwarranted and threaten the effective and efficient functioning of
administrative agencies.

II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF

ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA POWER-THERE AND BACK AGAIN 13
A. TowardBroadAdministrative Subpoena Power-"There"
Administrative subpoena power was once viewed with a great
deal of suspicion. Boyd v. United States'4 represents the "highwater
mark"'5 of the Fourth Amendment's6 protection against enforcement
of all subpoenas. In refusing to enforce a district court order that
Boyd produce an invoice verifying payment of customs duties, the
Supreme Court held that "compulsory production of... private books
and papers.., is the equivalent of a search and seizure... within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.'1 In Federal Trade Commn. v.
American Tobacco Co.,18 the Court manifested similar suspicion of
12. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024 (1993); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
13. With apologies to J.R.R. Tolkein. See J.R.R. Tolkein, The Hobbit or There and Back
Again (Houghton Mifflin, 1966).
14. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
15. Sean Doherty, Comment, Commodity Futures Trading Commn. v. Collins: Is the
Rationale Sound for Establishingan Exception to Subpoena Law for Tax Returns?, 7 DePaul
Bus. L. J. 365, 374 (1995).
16. 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. Const., Amend. IV.
17. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35. The erosion of the Boyd doctrine began soon after its
announcement. In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), the Court held that "the search and
seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment was not intended to interfere with the power of courts
to compel, through a subpoena duces tecum, the production, upon a trial in court, of
documentary evidence." Id. at 73. Such interference would render it "utterly impossible to
carry on the administration of justice." Id. (quoting Summers v. Moseley, 2 Cr. & M. 477).
Professor LaFave has commented that "[t]he continuing validity of Boyd's Fourth Amendment
holding is doubtful at best." Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 4.13(a) at 364 (West, 2d ed. 1987). LaFave goes on to describe Boyd as a "much
mooted case." Id. (quoting In re Addonizo, 53 N.J. 107, 248 A.2d 531, 537 (1968)).
18. 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
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administrative subpoenas. The Federal Trade Commission ('TC")
sought enforcement of a subpoena issued to obtain certain of the company's books and records in order to determine whether the company
was engaged in unfair methods of competition.19 Though the FTC's
investigation was well within its statutory authority, the Court held
that the "spirit" of the Fourth Amendment precluded the FTC from
conducting "fishing expeditions" directed at uncovering evidence of
wrongdoing in private papers. 20 Jones v. Securities and Exchange
Commn. 21 soon buttressed the American Tobacco holding. The Court
held that a subpoena issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") was unenforceable absent some prior evidence of
wrongdoing.22 These decisions relegated administrative agencies to a
reactive, rather than proactive, status.m While Congress was free to
confer plenary authority on an agency to regulate in an area, the
agency could not exercise this authority in a proactive or intelligent
manner without ready access to information that only the regulatory
target could supply.24

The onset of World War II accelerated the philosophical shift
in the Court's view of administrative government begun during the
New Deal. Wartime agencies required a great deal of information25
from regulated parties in order to accomplish their vast missions.
Recognizing this necessity, the Court signaled a retreat from exacting
scrutiny of administrative subpoenas in Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Perkins.26 The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act granted the
19. Id. at 303.
20. Id. at 305-06. The "fishing expedition" language from American Tobacco has been
quoted repeatedly in recent cases restricting administrative agencies' power to subpoena personal financial records. See, for example, Parks, 65 F.3d at 213; Walde, 13 F.3d at 949; Freese,
837 F. Supp. at 25.
21.
298 U.S. 1 (1936).
22. "An investigation not based upon specified grounds is quite as objectionable as a
search warrant not based upon specific statements of fact." Id. at 27.
23. This fact did not escape the notice of Justice Cardozo. Dissenting in Jones, he noted
that "attainment of the ends of public justice" would be only partial "unless retribution for the
past is added to prevention for the future." Id. at 30 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Justice Cardozo's
views would ultimately carry the day. See Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 203. Reactive
administrative oversight is not problematic if one assumes that market preferences will act to
reduce wrongdoing. The Great Depression, however, caused New Dealers to conclude that
proactive regulation was necessary to counteract market failures. These market failures were
determined to arise from "externalities ignored by the common law and a lack of information on
the part of consumers and workers." Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 421,438 (1987).
24. Davis and Pierce, 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 4.1 at 138 (cited in note 4).
25. Id.
26. 317 U.S. 501 (1943). This change in direction was foreshadowed by Judge Learned
Hand in McMann v. Securities and Exchange Commn., 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937). Judge Hand
rejected McMann's fourth amendment challenge to a subpoena issued by the SEC. He noted
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Secretary of Labor broad investigative power by authorizing the
Secretary to issue subpoenas to determine whether governmental contractors violated certain wage and hour requirements.27 The Court
regarded its role in the supervision of these investigations as narrow
and sought to respect Congress's assignment of the Act's administration to the Secretary rather than to the judicial branch.28 The Court
enforced the subpoena, finding it sufficient that the subpoenaed records were not "plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose" delegated to the Secretary.29 This highly deferential attitude
toward administrative subpoena power contrasted markedly with the
American Tobacco holding.
Endicott Johnson might have been read as a judicial response
to the exigencies of the war rather than as an endorsement of broad
agency investigative power. However, the Court's subsequent decisions in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling3O and United
States v. Morton Salt Co.31 invalidated such a contextualized reading.
The Oklahoma Press Court rejected the subpoena target's fourth
amendment challenge, holding that an administrative subpoena is not
a search and seizure.3 2 Rather, the Oklahoma Press Court held that
that "[tihe suppression of truth is a grievous necessity at best, more especially when as here the
inquiry concerns the public interest; it can be justified at all only when the opposed private
interest is supreme." Id. at 378. The decision may not have been a substantial departure from
American Tobacco and Jones, in that the SEC already had some evidence of illegal activity by
McMann prior to issuing the subpoena. Id. at 379. However, Judge Hand's opinion appears to
place more emphasis on the public interest in effective regulation than did either the American
Tobacco or Jones Courts.
27. Endicott Johnson, 317 U.S. at 502-03.
28. Id. at 507.
29. Id. at 509. In addition to adopting a highly deferential approach to the relevancy of
subpoenaed documents, the Court held that the issue of the subpoena target's coverage by the
statute was a matter to be determined initially by the Secretary, not the courts. Id. at 508-09.
This holding prevented subpoena targets from dragging out an investigation by forcing the
courts to try the coverage issue prior to enforcing a subpoena. Though the Endicott Johnson
holding was a marked departure from American Tobacco, remnants of administrative distrust
remained. Justice Murphy, in dissent, expressed his fear that, absent a more interventionist
role in subpoena enforcement, "intolerable oppression and injustice" by "well-meaning but overzealous officials" would result. Id. at 510.
30. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
31. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
32. 327 U.S. at 195. Elaborating on this holding, the Court stated that "[n]o officer or
other person has sought to enter petitioners' premises against their will, to search them, or to
seize or examine their books, records or papers without their assent, otherwise than pursuant to
orders of court authorized by law and made after adequate opportunity to present objections
which in fact were made." Id. Compare United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973) (holding
that a subpoena to appear before a grand jury is not a seizure in the fourth amendment sense,
even though the summons may be inconvenient or burdensome). The Morton Salt Court drew
an analogy between administrative subpoenas and grand jury investigations, noting that, like a
grand jury, the administrative agency "does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get
evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just
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the Fourth Amendment, if applicable,3 only guarded against abuse of
the subpoena power in cases of indefiniteness, overbreadth, unlawful
use, or irrelevance to the investigative purpose.3 Addressing the
proactive use of subpoena power to police entities within the agency's
regulatory jurisdiction, the Court held that the very purpose of an
administrative subpoena is to discover evidence of potentially illegal
35
conduct, not to react to pending actions against the subpoena target.
Indeed, under Morton Salt, "official curiosity" is a sufficient basis on
which to issue a subpoena.36
United States v. Powel17 crystallized the deferential attitude
toward judicial enforcement of administrative subpoenas. Petitioner
Powell sought to quash an IRS subpoena for business records related
to the tax returns of Powell's company.3 Powell argued that the IRS
must establish probable cause for tax fraud prior to issuing the subpoena. Interestingly, Powell asserted that the Internal Revenue
Code, rather than the Fourth Amendment, dictated this result.39 The
Court rejected this statutory interpretation, noting that accepting it
might seriously impede the IRS's ability to initiate investigations.40
The Powell Court recognized that Congress could limit the
investigative power of the IRS with a probable cause requirement.
Absent explicit statutory language, however, the courts could not infer
cause limitations on the subpoena power unless the legislative history
41
clearly attributed such an intent to Congress.

because it wants assurance that it is not." Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 642-43. For an interesting
discussion of the disappearing distinction between grand jury investigations and administrative
subpoena investigations in modern government, see Graham Hughes, Administrative

Subpoenas and the GrandJury: ConvergingStreams of Criminaland Civil Compulsory Process,
47 Vand. L. Rev. 573 (1994).
33. Professor LaFave notes that the Court's reference to the Fourth Amendment was only
one of analogy; the issue framed was one of balancing the public interest against private
security. LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure § 4.13(b) at 365 (cited in note 17).
34. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 208-09. The Morton Salt Court's holding was essentially
the same. "Ilt is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is
not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant." Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at
652.
35. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 201.
36. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652.
37. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
38. Id. at 49.
39. Id. at 52-53. Specifically, Justice Powell relied on § 7605(b), which provided:
No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations, and only
one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall be made for each taxable year
unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Secretary or his delegate, after
investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary.
Id.
40. Id. at 53-54.
41. Id. at 56.
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Citing the rejection of cause requirements in Oklahoma Press
and Morton Salt, the Powell Court synthesized the administrative
subpoena enforcement review into a four-part test: (1) whether the
investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, (2)
whether the inquiry may be relevant to that purpose, (3) whether the
agency already possesses the information sought, and (4) whether
necessary administrative steps have been followed. 42 Though the
Powell test was formulated in the context of IRS subpoenas, a subsequent decision held the test generally applicable to all administrative
subpoena enforcement actions. 43 The Powell test became the universal standard by which administrative subpoenas were evaluated.
Following these decisions, jurisprudence on enforcement of
administrative subpoenas appeared settled. The agency bore the
initial burden of proof, but needed only to make "a prima facie recital
of jurisdiction and statement of the basis for enforcement."''
This
burden was extremely light. Indeed, one commentator referred to the
requirement of a legitimate investigative purpose as a "Virtual nullity."45 The only judicial inquiries targeted the investigative authority

6
of the agency and the relevance of the subpoenaed documents.4
Courts did not undertake an individualized balancing of private and
public interests. Rather, recognition of the importance of effective
regulatory agencies resulted in an institutional fourth amendment
balancing of private and public interests. Specifically, the courts
balanced the institutional need for effective regulatory agencies
against the public's collective concern for personal privacy. This
institutional balancing produced the lenient tests of Endicott
Johnson, Oklahoma Press, Morton Salt, and Powell. Until recently,
satisfaction of these tests presented the only fourth amendment
4 barrier to administrative subpoena enforcement. 7

42. Id. at 57-58.
43. Securities and Exchange Commn. v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741-42
(1984). See John W. Bagby, Administrative Investigations: Preserving a Reasonable Balance
Between Agency Powers and TargetRights, 23 Am. Bus. L. J. 319, 324 (1985).
44. Bagby, 23 Am. Bus. L. J. at 322 (cited in note 43).
45. LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure § 4.13(b) at 367 (cited in note 17). Professor Cooper
remarked that since American Tobacco's restrictive holding, "the pendulum has swung far in
the opposite direction." Frank E. Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the
Production of Documents, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 187, 190 n.9 (1961). See Securities Exchange
Commn. v. Knopfler, 658 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he opponent of a subpoena has a heavy
burden if he seeks denial of enforcement on the ground that the subpoena is sought for an
invalid purpose").
46. Doherty, 7 DePaul Bus. L. J. at 420 (cited in note 15).
47. See, for example, Securities and Exchange Commn. v. Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. 564, 569
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that the subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the
inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite, and the
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B. Recent Restrictions on Administrative Subpoena Power"BackAgain"
Recently, the Seventh Circuit took a significant step away from
judicial deference to administrative subpoena power in CFTC v.
Collins.48 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC")
subpoenaed Collins's income tax returns to investigate possible civil
violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. 49 Judge Posner deter-

mined that the district court had abused its discretion in enforcing
the subpoenas. This holding did not rest on fourth amendment
grounds.50 Instead, the court refused to enforce the subpoena because
doing so would threaten the "self-reporting, self-assessing character of
the income tax system."'
Judge Posner contended that routinely
requiring investigation targets to hand over these "highly sensitive"
documents would create a disincentive to file an income tax return. 52
Discussion of Endicott Johnson and its progeny was conspicuously absent from Judge Posner's opinion. Undoubtedly, the subpoena passed muster under the requirements of these cases. 53 Thus,

the Collins decision may be viewed as a balancing of two competing
public interests-the interest in effective regulatory agencies and the
interest in an effective self-reporting income tax system-with the
latter interest prevailing. Judge Posner did not explicitly balance
these two interests, however, making it difficult to assess the merits

information is reasonably relevant). Indeed, judicial deference to administrative subpoenas led
Judge Friendly to postulate that the "less rigid requirements of the due process clause" rather
than the Fourth Amendment provided the only check on enforcement. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d
72, 79 (2d Cir. 1973).
48. 997 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1993).
49. Id. at 1231-32. Specifically, the CFTC believed that the presence of tax motives would
serve as evidence of a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act. Id. at 1232.
50. Collins did not assert a fourth amendment challenge. Collins's primary objection to
the subpoena rested on fifth amendment grounds. Id. at 1232. Judge Posner rejected the fifth
amendment challenge, holding that Collins had not been compelled by the government to place
any incriminating information on his tax return and thus had no claim of privilege. Id. at 1233.
For a discussion of the current confused state of the required records doctrine in fifth
amendment jurisprudence, see Akhil Reed Amar and Ren~e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 857, 869-73 (1995).
51. Collins,997 F.2d at 1233.
52. Id. This rationale was questioned in a recent comment. See Doherty, 7 DePaul Bus.
L. J. at 425-28 (cited in note 15). The commentator suggested that the taxpayer's motivation to
disclose income fully is primarily achieved by the threat of IRS penalties. Id. at 426.
53. The CFTC is statutorily empowered to subpoena documents deemed "relevant or
material to the inquiry" regarding violations of the Commodities Exchange Act. Doherty, 7
DePaul Bus. L. J. at 424 (cited in note 15). The subpoena request was specifically limited to tax
returns. The information in the return was reasonably relevant to the investigation because
there appeared to be a correlation between tax benefits and motive to violate the Act. Id.
(applying the Morton Salt inquiry to the subpoena request).
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of the decision on these grounds. Rather, his criticism of the CFTC's
"bare representation that the tax return might contain information
' suggests a more general distrust of
germane to the investigation M
administrative subpoena power. Particularly, Judge Posner seemed
to suggest that the CFTC's narrow regulatory mission caused it to
suffer from tunnel vision. Accordingly, Judge Posner advocated a
judicial oversight role in agency investigations to assure that broader
policy concerns are considered.
What Collins merely suggested, Freese v. FDIC55 made clear.
In Freese, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") issued
subpoenas seeking personal financial records from former directors
and officers of the failed New Hampshire Savings Bank. 56 The purpose of the investigation was three-fold: to determine whether any
claims could be brought against the former directors and officers,
whether the directors and officers had sufficient assets to justify
pursuit of any such claims, and whether the FDIC should seek to
freeze or attach any assets.5 7 The court refused to enforce the subpoena on two grounds. First, it held that subpoenaing personal financial records in order to determine the cost-effectiveness of an enforcement action was improper. 58 Second, and more generally, the
court blasted the FDIC's "hubristic" use of the subpoena power to
infringe on fundamental constitutional rights. 59 Citing American
Tobacco's fourth amendment condemnation of "fishing expeditions,"
the Freese court held that the FDIC's failure to suggest specific
wrongdoing by the former directors and officers made the subpoena
6
unenforceable on any grounds. 1

RTC v. Walde61 elaborated upon the "improper cost-effectiveness purpose" theme of Freese. The Resolution Trust Company
('RTC") issued subpoenas to former directors and officers of failed
savings and loan institutions seeking personal financial records in
order to investigate possible wrongdoing and to assess the cost-effectiveness of possible litigation against the directors and officers. 62 The
54. Collins, 997 F.2d at 1234. Under Morton Salt, bare representations of relevancy are
generally sufficient for enforcement of a subpoena. See Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652 (holding
that mere "official curiosity" is a sufficient predicate to a subpoena request).
55. 837 F. Supp. 22 (D.N.H. 1993).
56. Id. at23.

57.

Id.

58.

Id. at 24.

59.
60.

Id. at 25.
Id.

61. 18 F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
62. Id. at 944. RTC was created as part of the FIRREA. 103 Stat. at 183. The RTC may
be appointed as conservator of failed savings and loan institutions. As conservator, the RTC is
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Walde court held that some of the financial records were relevant to
the RTC's investigation of possible wrongdoing.63 Unlike the Freese
court, the Walde court cited Morton Salt and Powell for the proposition that the RTC was not required to make a preliminary determination of liability in order to subpoena these relevant personal records.64
In discussing the use of the subpoena power to determine the
cost-effectiveness of enforcement action, however, the court clouded
the issue of the preliminary determination of liability. Some language
in the decision suggested that the RTC must have an articulable
suspicion of wrongdoing before subpoenaing personal financial information for any reason. 5 Other language suggested that this level
of suspicion should arise only following a subpoena of personal financial records to determine the cost-effectiveness of an enforcement
action.6
In either case, the asserted rationale for requiring an
articulable suspicion for the subpoena of personal financial records
involved a distinction in the privacy interests implicated in disclosure
of personal, as opposed to corporate, financial records.67 Like the
Freese court, the Walde court cited American Tobacco's fourth
amendment prohibition of "fishing expeditions"68 as authority for
limiting administrative subpoena power in the context of personal
financial records. The court then enigmatically declared that it would
statutorily charged with preserving and conserving the assets of the institution. To accomplish
this task, the RTC is empowered to avoid fraudulent transfers, assert claims against the directors and officers, seek court orders to attach assets, and issue subpoenas. Walde, 18 F.3d at
944. RTC is also directed to "minimize[ ] the amount of any loss realized in the resolution of
cases." Id. at 948 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(iv)).
63. Walde, 18 F.3d at 947.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 949.
66. Compare two statements made in the case: "[W]e think that the RTC must have at
least an articulable suspicion that a former officer or director is liable to the failed institution
before a subpoena for personal financial information may issue," id. at 949; 'e... hold
that.., where the RTC has no articulable suspicion to believe that the former officer or director
is liable... the RTC may not subpoena his personal financial information for the purpose of
assessing the cost-effectiveness of prospective litigation," id. Later D.C. Circuit cases have
clarified this ambiguity by opting for the latter, less restrictive holding. See RTC v. Frates, 61
F.3d 962, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re Sealed Case (Administrative Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412,
1416 (D.C. Cir. 1994); RTC v. Thornton, 41 F.3d 1539, 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Other circuits,
however, have apparently adopted the former, more restrictive holding. See FDIC v. Wentz, 55
F.3d 905, 908-09 (3d Cir. 1995); In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1139-40 (2d Cir. 1995).
It is important to note that the RTC's argument in support of subpoena power was based
entirely on statutory construction. See Walde, 18 F.3d at 948. RTC argued that the sum of
several mandates of FIRREA indicated congressional intent that the RTC assess the costeffectiveness of any enforcement action. Id. No argument was advanced that determining costeffectiveness is an inherently legitimate investigative function. See Part IV.C for a discussion of
the merits of this argument.
67. Walde, 18 F.3d at 948-49.
68. See notes 3 and 20 and accompanying text.
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not reach Walde's fourth amendment challenge to the subpoena,69
despite having done exactly that by discussing American Tobacco.
Although later decisions seemed to limit the effect of Walde on
agency subpoena power, 70 the case laid the groundwork for future
restrictions on administrative subpoena power in two ways. First,
Walde drew a distinction between subpoenaing corporate and personal financial records for fourth amendment purposes. 71 Second, the
Walde court questioned the legitimacy of assessing the costeffectiveness of an enforcement action as a proper purpose of agency
subpoena power. Furthermore, the case granted a district court more
authority to edit subpoenas and to eliminate document requests that
the court determined were intended to assess cost-effectiveness.7 2 The
court's assumption of this type of supervisory role thereby curtailed
agency investigative discretion.
The distinction between personal and corporate financial records led the First Circuit to establish the most sweeping of recent
restrictions on administrative subpoena power in Parks v. FDIC73
The First Circuit withdrew the opinion after granting a rehearing en
banc.74 Though no longer precedent, the initial Parks majority and
dissenting opinions best contrast the competing concerns in
administrative subpoena enforcement. The court held that the Fourth
Amendment bars the administrative subpoena of personal financial

69. Walde, 18 F.3d at 949.
70. The RTC has since been careful to characterize its subpoena requests for personal
financial information as relevant to uncovering wrongdoing. Even if one of the purposes of the
subpoena is to determine the cost-effectiveness of an enforcement action, the D.C. Circuit has
been willing to enforce the subpoena on a permissible alternate basis. See Frates, 61 F.3d at
964-65; Thomas P. Vartanian, Robert H. Ledig, and Paul D. Marquardt, RTC Counts Cash First,
InvestigatesLiability Later, 12 Banking Policy Rep. 1, 16 (July 19, 1993). However, at least one
case suggests that the D.C. Circuit may have attempted to reinstate the articulable suspicion
requirement for subpoena of personal records by recasting the issue as one of statutory
interpretation rather than fourth amendment concern. Sealed Case, 42 F.3d at 1418 (holding
that absent specific statutory authority, agencies cannot "cast about for potential wrongdoing in
an individual's personal financial documents").
71. Walde, 18 F.3d at 948.
72. Id. at 949.
73. 65 F.3d 207 (1st Cir. 1995). The facts of Parks were essentially identical to those of
Walde, except that the FDIC rather than the RTC acted as conservator of the failed institution.
See note 62 and accompanying text. The Parks court criticized the Walde court for not adopting
a blanket rule against subpoena of personal financial records for any person absent sufficient
suspicion of wrongdoing. 65 F.3d at 212. The Parks court also criticized Wentz, which
apparently read Walde as setting forth such a rule, for striking the public/private balance too far
in favor of the public. Id. at 213. See discussion of this reading of Walde in note 66.
74. The First Circuit granted a rehearing en banc on November 8, 1995 and subsequently
withdrew the opinion from the bound version of the Federal Reporter. Citations in this Note
refer to the advance sheet, in which the opinion originally appeared. Alternatively, the case
may be accessed at 1995 WL 529629. The rehearing en banc was docketed for February 2, 1996.
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records unless the agency can "articulate a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing" by the target of the investigation7 5 The Parks court
asserted that this standard would "stop short of probable cause,' 76 but
required the agency to articulate specific facts indicative of
individualized suspicion. 7 The court acknowledged the strong public
interest in resolving the affairs of failed banking institutions, but
found that the privacy interest in personal financial records outweighed this interest, absent sufficient suspicion of wrongdoing 8
Consistent with prior cases in other jurisdictions, the First Circuit
cited American Tobacco to support these restrictions on the subpoena
79
power.
As discussed above, recent decisions appear to reflect the pre1940 distrust of administrative government in many respects. By
revitalizing American Tobacco's precedential value and drawing a
distinction between corporate and personal financial records, these
decisions threaten the effective investigation of individuals within an
agency's regulatory jurisdiction.8 0 Indeed, under Parks, such investigations can occur only on a reactive basis. 81 Furthermore, restrictions
on the use of the subpoena power to determine cost-effectiveness
threaten the ability of agencies to use limited budgetary resources
efficiently while carrying out their statutory mandates.
III. PERSONAL AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL RECORDS-DISTINCTION
WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE?
Courts have asserted that subpoenas for personal, as opposed
to corporate, financial records implicate greater privacy concerns.
This distinction underlies heightened suspicion requirements for
enforcement of administrative subpoenas seeking personal financial
records. 8 2 This Part analyzes the validity of this distinction, and
75.
76.

Parks,65 F.3d at 214.
Id.

77. Id. at 215.
78. Id. at 214. Specifically, the court disapproved of the FDIC's "asser[tion] of the power
to rummage through financial papers of private citizens based on nothing more than the hope
that illegal conduct might be revealed." Id. at 213.
79. Id. at 213.
80. 'By handing the targets of agency investigations a potent new weapon, the majority
facilitates the insertion of monkey wrenches into the administrative machinery, and creates the
potential not only for delaying agency probes (thereby further eroding agency effectiveness), but
also for increasing the extent of judicial intrusions into the agency sphere." Id. at 218 (Selya, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
81. See discussion in note 23 and accompanying text.
82. See notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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contends that heightened suspicion requirements for enforcement of
administrative subpoenas seeking personal financial records threaten
agencies' investigative effectiveness.
A. SubpoenasAre Not SearchesRegardless of the Target
The Parks court's hostility to administrative subpoenas
appears to stem from its equating an administrative subpoena for
personal financial records with an actual search. Specifically, the
court derides the FDIC for "assert[ing] the power to rummage through
the financial papers of private citizens."83 This equation leads the
court to mandate a "reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing" as a
prerequisite to enforcement of an administrative subpoena for
personal financial records. 84 Equating an administrative subpoena
with an actual search, however, is contrary to precedent and
unnecessary in enforcement proceedings.
For purposes of fourth amendment analysis, administrative
subpoenas are distinguishable from actual searches and seizures. 85
83. Parks,65 F.3d at 213. This choice of words is particularly interesting in that the lack
of ability to rummage through a person's property has traditionally been asserted as the key
distinction between an administrative subpoena and an actual search. "A subpoena duces
tecum, obviously, is much less intrusive than a search warrant: the police do not go rummaging
through one's home, office, or desk if armed with only a subpoena." Stanford Daily v. Zurcher,
353 F. Supp. 124, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd 436 U.S. 547
(1978). See United States v.Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) ("[T]he real evil
aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which
consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence against him"). Thus, this
choice of verb by the Parks court suggests that it sees little, if any, distinction between an
administrative subpoena for personal financial records and an actual search.
84. Parks, 65 F.3d at 214. Indeed, the court stated that "the Supreme Court has often
utilized a reasonableness standard which requires the government to articulate a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing by the target of the search." Id. at 214. The cases cited by the Parks
court in support of the heightened scrutiny of administrative subpoenas for personal financial
records are fourth amendment challenges to actual searches, however, not subpoenas. See, for
example, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985) (challenging a public school official's
search of a student's handbag); Camarav. Municipal Court of San Francisco,387 U.S. 523, 526
(1967) (challenging a housing ordinance that allowed warrantless inspections of private
apartments).
85. The short answer to the Fourth Amendment objections is that the records in these
cases present no question of actual search and seizure, but raise only the question
whether orders of court for the production of specified records have been validly made;
and no sufficient showing appears to justify setting them aside. No officer or other
person has sought to enter petitioners' premises against their will, to search them, or to
seize or examine their books, records or papers without their assent, otherwise than
pursuant to orders of court authorized by law and made after adequate opportunity to
present objections, which were in fact made.
Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 195. See Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)
("[T]he enforceability of the administrative subpoena.., at issue here is governed ...by our
decision in Oklahoma Press). Compare by analogy Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 9 (holding that a
subpoena to appear before a grand jury is not a seizure in the fourth amendment sense, despite
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The rationale for this distinction is that, unlike an actual search, an
administrative subpoena is not self-executing 86 The target of a
subpoena has an opportunity to request that a court quash the
subpoena prior to its enforcement.8 7 At an enforcement proceeding,
the subpoena target may demonstrate that the subpoena was issued
for an improper purpose such as harassment, pressure to settle a
collateral dispute, or bad faith.8s

The Powell criteria demonstrate

abuse and provide
judicial recognition of the potential for subpoena
89
adequate protections for a subpoena target.
Until recently, courts routinely found the Powell test satisfied
when a target challenged an administrative subpoena. The Powell
checks are not, however, "devoid of an inhibiting effect."90
Specifically, the Powell criteria create procedural hurdles that allow
courts to prevent an agency from pursuing groundless subpoenas. 91 In
addition, by setting forth grounds to challenge a subpoena, the Powell
criteria induce agency personnel to curb the scope of subpoenas voluntarily, as agencies have a "self-interest in avoiding judicial enforcement."92

An administrative subpoena of personal financial records
should not be treated as an actual search. The subpoena target
retains the right to challenge enforcement of the subpoena in the
courts. Requiring an administrative agency to articulate a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing prior to enforcement of a subpoena
represents an attempt by the courts to garner an unduly broad
supervisory role in agency investigations. The courts assume a role

the fact that the summons may be inconvenient or burdensome). Of course, this distinction has
not always been recognized. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
86. Bagby, 23 Am. Bus. L. J. at 319-20 (cited in note 43). The distinction between subpoenas and searches has also been drawn for fifth amendment purposes. The Supreme Court has
held that records obtained by law enforcement officials during a legal search and seizure do not
Andresen v.
violate a defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976). The rationale for the holding is that during a search, a
defendant is not compelled to turn over the records. Id. In contrast, compliance with a grand
jury subpoena for personal records may compel a defendant to disclose records containing
incriminating information. Thus, the fifth amendment privilege may be asserted as a defense to
compliance with a grand jury subpoena. Id. at 473-74.
87. Stanford Daily, 353 F. Supp. at 130.
88. OTS v. Ernst & Young, 786 F. Supp. 46,50 (D.D.C. 1992).
89. "In line with the... requirement that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable,
the district court is authorized to impose reasonable conditions and restrictions with respect to
the production of the subpoenaed material if the demand is unduly burdensome." FTC v.
Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). See Doherty, 7 DePaul Bus.
L. J. at 420 (cited in note 15).
90. Marc I. Steinberg, SEC Subpoena Enforcement Practice,11 J. Corp. L. 1, 5 (1985).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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more akin to proactive supervision of the investigation than to reactive supervision, the latter being designed only to prevent abuse of the
subpoena power. The reasonable suspicion standard articulated by
the Parks court actually exceeds that required for enforcement of a
grand jury subpoena. 93 Significant burdens on grand jury subpoena
power have been consistently rejected as threatening the grand jury's
investigative power and the public's interest in expeditious adminiThis laissez-faire attitude toward
stration of the criminal laws.9
grand jury subpoena power probably stems from courts' comfort with
a supervisory role over grand jury investigations. Their reluctance to
adopt a similar attitude toward administrative subpoena enforcement
suggests latent hostility to delegation of a similar investigative role to
agencies. Assumption of a supervisory role over agency9 5investigations
is antithetical to this delegation of investigative power.
Of course, congressional assignment of an investigative
function to an agency does not require the courts to "rubber-stamp"
the actions of an agency.96 This Note contends, however, that the
Powell criteria 97 strike the appropriate balance between effective
agency investigative power and the need for a judicial check on overzealous agency officials. Courts will not enforce subpoenas that are
issued for an improper purpose or irrelevant to a proper agency
Recharacterization of administrative
investigative purpose.
subpoenas seeking personal financial records as actual searches is
98
merely a judicial attempt to revive the long-rejected Boyd doctrine.
Rejuvenation of this type of judicial oversight role in agency
investigation is particularly harmful in the area of banking
93. "[An administrative agency] is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which... can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants
assurance that it is not." Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 642-43.
94. United States v. R Enterprises,498 U.S. 292, 298-99 (1991) (quoting Dionisio, 410 U.S.
at 17). Commentators have noted that the Fourth Amendment's limitation on grand jury

subpoenas applies only to "the extent to which subpoenas can compel the production of
individuals' personal, nonbusiness documents." Sara S. Beale, William C. Bryson, and Rebecca
E. Swenson, 1 Grand Jury Law and Practice§ 6.27 at 177 (Callaghan & Co., 1986). See Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 n.7 (1976) ("Special problems of privacy which might be
presented by subpoena of a personal diary are not involved here").
95. See Endicott Johnson, 317 U.S. at 507 ("Congress submitted the administration of the
Act to the judgment of the Secretary of Labor, not to the judgment of the courts'. See also
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 862-63 (8th Cir. 1956) ("Some exploration or fishing
necessarily is inherent and entitled to exist in all documentary productions sought by a grand
jury').
96. Chapman v. Maren Elwood College, 225 F.2d 230, 234 (9th Cir. 1955).
97. See note 42 and accompanying text.
98. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text. See also Addonizo, 248 A.2d at 539-40
(discussing the dangers of indiscriminately applying fourth amendment decisions in actual
search cases to subpoena cases).
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regulation. Agencies charged with regulating the banking industry
must act proactively in order to prevent wrongdoing. Reactive
regulation increases the likelihood that taxpayers will bear the costs
of wrongdoing via FDIC payments to depositors. 99
B. Personalv. CorporateFinancialRecords
As discussed above, the Parks court sought to justify its
reasonable suspicion standard for enforcement of administrative
subpoenas for personal financial records by blurring, if not erasing,
the distinction between an actual search and an administrative subpoena. The court preceded this equation of subpoenas with actual
searches by drawing a fourth amendment privacy distinction between
personal and corporate financial records. 1' °
Only administrative
subpoenas for the former were equated with actual searches.10o
Although other courts have not equated any type of administrative
subpoena with an actual search, some courts have cited a distinction
between personal and corporate records as justification for heightened
scrutiny of administrative subpoenas of personal financial records.102
While some early cases suggested such a distinction,13 subsequent
developments in administrative subpoena law have practically

eliminated

it.104

This Section contends that courts should find no

privacy distinction between personal and corporate financial records
for purposes of administrative subpoena enforcement.

99. See Jennifer J. Alexander, Note, Is the Cross-GuaranteeConstitutional?,48 Vand. L.
Rev. 1742, 1751-52 (1995).
100. Parks, 65 F.3d at 210-11.
101. Id.
102. Wentz, 55 F.3d at 908 (enforcing a subpoena but noting that privacy concerns must be
considered when personal, as opposed to corporate, financial records are subpoenaed); McVane,
44 F.3d at 1136 ("In contrast to the limited rights of corporations, the courts have recognized
certain 'rights to privacy' of individuals .... Among these protected rights is 'the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters' "); Thornton, 41 F.3d at 1544 ("[A]lthough an
agency may subpoena corporate financial information solely to ascertain the cost-effectiveness of
contemplated litigation, it is less free to subpoena personal financial information for the same
purpose'; Walde, 18 F.3d at 948 ("The Supreme Court reminds us that 'corporations can claim
no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy' ").
At least one district court had drawn this distinction prior to the Walde decision. Breakey v.
Inspector General, 836 F.Supp 422, 426 (E.D. Mich. 1993). In Breakey, the court did not elaborate on the fourth amendment ramifications of this distinction. Rather, the court determined
that the subpoena met the requirements for enforcement set forth in the Right to Financial
Privacy Act. Id. at 427.
103. See discussion in Part III.B.1.
104. See discussion in Part III.B.2. See also Parks, 65 F.3d. at 216 (Selya, J., dissenting)
(discussing recent legal developments that blur the distinction between privacy interests in
personal and corporate financial records).
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1. Early Case Law Suggests a Distinction
Courts drawing a fourth amendment distinction between
personal and corporate financial records have relied on scant authority. The Parks decision is typical.105 The court established the inferior
privacy rights of corporations by citing Oklahoma Press and Morton
Salt.106 Each decision indicated that corporations receive lesser constitutional protection of privacy. 0 7 The Oklahoma Press Court reasoned that corporations receive reduced privacy protection because
they are creatures of state law and as such, are "subject to broad
visitorial power.1' °8 When viewed in isolation, these holdings lend
some support to the proposition that a subpoena of personal financial
records mandates some higher level of scrutiny. As Judge Selya
suggested in his Parks dissent, however, these cases should be read as
reflecting the Court's desire to keep this question open. 0 9
Judge Selya suggests that the Oklahoma Press and Morton
Salt Courts merely intended to confine their rulings to the facts of the
cases before them." 0 The historical context of the decisions supports
this view. These cases arose during the early stages of a dramatic
shift in judicial attitude toward administrative government."' Given
the evolving nature of judicial attitudes toward administrative government and American Tobacco's relatively recent condemnation of
agency investigative power," 2 Judge Selya's reading of the cases as
limited to their facts appears particularly appropriate.
Ironically, American Tobacco's strong fourth amendment
condemnation of administrative subpoenas, 13 considered in light of
the facts of the case, may actually provide support for a lack of distinction between corporate and personal financial records. The FTC's
subpoena was directed toward the American Tobacco Company. No
natural persons were identified as investigative targets."4 Yet, the
Court failed to distinguish between corporate and personal records in

105. See Parks, 65 F.3d at 210-11.
106. Id. at 211.
107. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652 ("[C]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in
the enjoyment of a right to privacy"); Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 205 ("[C]orporations are not
entitled to all of the constitutional protections which private individuals have in these and
related matters).
108. 327 U.S. at 204-05.
109. 65 F.3d at 216 (Selya, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. See notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
112. See American Tobacco, 264 U.S. at 305-06.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 303.
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condemning all fishing expeditions into private papers.
The
announcement of this universal and complete condemnation in a case
in which the defendant was a corporation suggests that "financial
records are financial records are financial records" n in the eyes of the
judiciary.
It is certainly difficult to see how the Court could
strengthen its condemnation if the defendant happened to be a
natural person. Despite this plausible reading of American Tobacco,
courts hostile to administrative investigations prefer to use this
rhetorical talisman to ward off administrative subpoenas of personal
n
financial records.1
2. Subsequent Erosion of the Distinction-Does Absence of
Evidence Imply Evidence of Absence?
Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt both suggested that the line
of demarcation for fourth amendment privacy concerns in administrative subpoenas should be drawn between personal and corporate
records." 7 Subsequent case law has shown, however, that the nature
of the records soughtl8 and the investigative power conferred upon an
agency,119 rather than the identity of the investigative target, are the
primary considerations in subpoena enforcement proceedings.
Perhaps the strongest support for the lack of a distinction between personal and corporate financial records for fourth amendment
purposes lies in the courts' consistent failure to draw such a
distinction. Ryan v. United States,120 handed down on the same day

115. Parks,65 F.3d at 217 (Selya, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 213; Walde, 18 F.3d at 949; Freese, 837 F. Supp. at 25.
117. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652; Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 205.
118. The distinction between individuals on the one hand and corporations on the
other, however, does not explain the lack of protection afforded to individuals served
with subpoenas for documents. In the case of private individuals, perhaps the mere
relevance standard is sufficient to protect privacy interests in documents related to
economic activity, but arguably purely private papers should be protected by requiring
the investigatory body to meet a more stringent standard.
LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure § 4.13 at 383 (cited in note 17). See United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (holding that the nature of the documents sought to be protected

determines whether there is a "legitimate expectation of privacy" for fourth amendment

purposes); United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("We are
not so outraged by the intrusion on privacy that accompanies the seizure of [business records] as
we are by the seizure of a diary').
119. See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1989) ("We are especially
reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears that Congress has considered the

relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself"); Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Howatt, 525 F.2d 226, 229 (1st Cir. 1975) ("[lIt is not the court's role to intrude
into the investigative agency's function"); Doherty, 7 DePaul Bus. L. J. at 420 (cited in note 15).
120. 379 U.S. 61 (1964).
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as Powell, provides a particularly noteworthy example of this
omission. In Ryan, the petitioner challenged an IRS subpoena
requiring him to turn over eleven years of personal financial
records. 121
The Court summarily affirmed the Sixth Circuit's
enforcement of the subpoena for the reasons set forth in Powell.122
The failure to draw a distinction between the corporate financial
records sought in Powell and the personal financial records sought in
Ryan strongly indicates that the Court intended the Powell test'23 to
apply equally to natural persons and corporations.
Unlike the
Oklahoma Press Court's apparent focus on the identity of the
investigative target, the Ryan and Powell Courts' focus explicitly
shifted to the nature of the records and the authority of the investigating agency. These cases can be reconciled, however, by characterizing the Oklahoma Press holding as resting on the principle that
records of a business or economic nature do not merit heightened
fourth amendment protection, regardless of the identity of the owner
of those records. Such a reading, while not readily apparent, may be
24
inferred from the language of Oklahoma Press.
This absence of a distinction between personal and corporate
financial records is not limited to the enforcement of IRS subpoenas.
Judicial enforcement of subpoenas issued by the SEC also noticeably
lacks any such distinction.'2 In SEC v. Howatt,26 the SEC issued
subpoenas to a number of individuals seeking personal financial
records pursuant to an investigation of possible securities fraud.127
The subpoenas were issued after the SEC received a written
complaint from a broker. 28 This case can be reconciled with Parks if
one assumes that the written complaint provided the reasonable
121. Id. at 61.
122. Id. at 62. See notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
123. Specifically, the four-prong inquiry for enforcement of an administrative subpoena.
See note 42 and accompanying text.
124. After discussing the distinction between private and corporate records, the Court
stated that "[w]hatever limits there may be to congressional power to provide for the production
of corporate or other business records, therefore, they are not to be found in view of the course of
prior decisions, in any such absolute or universal immunity as petitioners seek." Oklahoma
Press, 327 U.S. at 208 (emphasis added). While the reference to "other business records" could
be read simply as an attempt by the Court to make its decision applicable to other business
entities such as partnerships or sole proprietorships, the Powell and Ryan holdings seem to
require this sentence to be read as making Oklahoma Press applicable to all business or economic records, personal or corporate.
125. See, for example, Knopfler, 658 F.2d at 25; Howatt, 525 F.2d at 226; Ayers v. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 482 F. Supp. 747 (D. Mont. 1980); Securities and Exchange
Commission, 397 F. Supp. 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
126. 525 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1975).
127. Id. at 228.
128. Id.
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suspicion necessary to launch an investigation into private financial
records.129

Yet, the plain language of Howatt makes such a

reconciliation impossible. The Howatt court specifically held that no
cause requirements would limit enforcement of the subpoenas.130
Thus, the First Circuit appears to have overruled its Howatt holding
in Parks.
Since the Parks court failed to overrule Howatt expressly, the
cases could be harmonized by arguing that Congress conferred
broader investigative power to the SEC than to the FDIC.
Comparison of the enabling statutes of the two agencies, however,
reveals essentially identical investigative powers. 131 Furthermore, the
Parks court's reliance on fourth amendment grounds to strike down
the FDIC's subpoena of personal financial documents makes statutory
construction distinctions impossible. Presumably, the SEC would be
bound to the reasonable suspicion threshold in the enforcement of its
subpoenas for personal financial records in the First Circuit.132

129. See Parks,65 F.3d at 214. The Third Circuit in Wentz reached the same conclusion as
the Howatt court, namely that the subpoena for personal financial records was enforceable.
Wentz, 55 F.3d at 909. The Wentz court, however, engaged in the same reasonable suspicion
analysis as the Parks court. Thus, it too is analytically inconsistent with Howatt. See also
McVane, 44 F.3d at 1139-40.
130. Howatt, 525 F.2d at 229 ('The Commission is not required by statute or the
Constitution to limit its investigations to those against whom 'probable' or even 'reasonable'
cause to suspect a violation has been established). Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. at 564, accords with
Howatt. In Kaplan, the SEC issued subpoenas for personal financial records pursuant to § 20(a)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933. Id. at 565. In enforcing the subpoenas, the court
held that 'itis well settled that the Fourth Amendment does not now restrict an administrative
subpoena for records." Id. at 568.
131. The SEC has the power to "administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses,
compel their attendance, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers,
correspondence, memoranda, or other records which the Commission deems relevant or
material to the inquiry." 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1994 ed.). Similarly, the FDIC is empowered to
"administer oaths and affirmations, to take... depositions, and to issue.., subpoenas and
subpoenas duces tecum." 12 U.S.C. § 1818(n) (1994 ed.). This investigative power is not
affected by the FDIC's acting as a conservator or receiver of a failed financial institution. Id.
§ 1821(d)(2)(W(i).
132. Judge Selya remarked that the "upshot [of Parks) is to create a singular benchmark
against which certain administrative subpoenas henceforth will have to be evaluated in the
First Circuit-and only the First Circuit." Parks, 65 F.3d at 216 (Selya, J., dissenting).
Apparently, though, the same benchmark will be applied in the Second and Third Circuits,
though with perhaps less bite. See Wentz, 55 F.3d at 908-09; McVane, 44 F.3d at 1139-40.
Judge Selya's reference to "certain" administrative subpoenas is not exactly clear. The
reference may be to any administrative subpoena issued for personal financial records or may be
an attempt to distinguish Howatt. As mentioned above, however, the constitutional holding of
Parks makes any statutory construction distinctions impossible.
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3. Is the Current Debate Merely Judicial D6jh Vu?-United States v.
Miller133 and the Right to Financial Privacy Act'34
Consistent judicial failure to draw a fourth amendment distinction between personal and corporate financial records strongly
suggests that no such distinction is constitutionally required. This
section analyzes several 1970s supreme court decisions eliminating
essentially all privacy protections for personal financial records held
by a bank, and Congress's response to those decisions. This analysis
provides further evidence that no heightened privacy interests are
implicated when an agency subpoenas personal, rather than
corporate, financial records.
In California Bankers Association v. Schultz,135 the Supreme
Court heard a challenge to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 ('BSA").
Congress enacted the BSA in response to concern about white collar
crime136 and the secret stashing of American currency in foreign bank
1'
accounts. 37
The BSA imposed numerous recordkeeping requirements
on domestic banks, including: keeping copies of all checks over
$100.00 for five years; maintaining systems to trace large deposits for
two years; and collecting signature cards, social security numbers,
and names and addresses of all account holders.'1 Additionally, the
BSA required domestic banks to report certain transactions to governmental law enforcement agencies."39
The plaintiffs in Schultz included several individual bank customers who challenged the BSA as violative of their fourth
amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure.140 The
Court rejected their argument, holding that the BSA did not compel
automatic reporting of any transaction.'41 In particular, the Court
noted that the BSA's legislative history and regulations promulgated
pursuant to the BSA indicated that access to banking records would
be adequately controlled by "existing legal process.' ' 2 Presumably,
133. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
134. 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq. (1994 ed.).
135. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
136. Id. at 26-27.
137. Nancy M. Kirschner, The Right to FinancialPrivacyAct of 1978-The Congressional
Response to United States v. Miller: A Procedural Right to Challenge Access to Financial
Records, 13 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 10, 15 (1979).
138. Id. at 16.
139. Patricia A. Calore, Note, The Right to FinancialPrivacyAct and the SEC, 39 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 1073, 1074 n.13 (1982).
140. 416 U.S. at 41.
141. Id. at 54.
142. Id. at 52.
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this legal process would limit governmental access to bank records to
that access obtained by enforceable subpoenas. 4 3 According to the
Schultz Court, the mere maintenance of records under the BSA does
not constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 1 4
Justice Douglas strongly criticized this holding. In his dissent
he contended that banking records reveal far more about individuals
than merely their financial condition. 145 He also condemned the
majority's failure to characterize the reporting requirements as a
search or seizure.46 Despite the dissents' sharp criticisms, 47 the majority in Schultz indicated that legal process would serve as a check
on governmental access to personal financial records. The decision
did not address the question of whether the bank customer could
challenge governmental access to bank records through the legal proc8
ess. 4
The Supreme Court resolved this question in United States v.
Miller.19 Miller was convicted of several federal offenses stemming
from his operation of an illegal whiskey still.150 Prior to Miller's indictment, the grand jury issued subpoenas to two banks where Miller
maintained accounts. 151 The subpoenas directed the banks to produce
any records maintained for accounts in Miller's name. 52 Neither the
banks nor the state notified Miller of the subpoena requests. 53 The
Fifth Circuit held that the government had improperly circumvented
Miller's fourth amendment rights against unreasonable search and
seizure.'5 While acknowledging that the recordkeeping requirements
of the BSA were facially constitutional under Schultz, the court reasoned that the grand jury subpoenas issued to the banks did not

143. Kirschner, 13 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 16 (cited in note 137). While the Court was silent
as to what legal process was controlling, Kirschner notes that floor debate prior to the BSA's
enactment indicates that the House of Representatives was under the impression that access
would be limited by enforceable subpoenas.
144. 416 U.S. at 54.
145. Id. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("In a sense a person is defined by the checks he
writes.... [T]he banking transactions of an individual give a fairly accurate account of his
religion, ideology, opinions, and interests").
146. Id. at 89-90 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
147. Justices Brennan and Marshall filed separate dissents. Id. at 91, 93.
148. Calore, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 1075 n.13 (cited in note 139).
149. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
150. Id. at 436.
151. Id. at 437.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 438.
154. 500 F.2d 751, 756-58 (5th Cir. 1974).
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amount to the adequate legal process required by Shultz for access to
the records. 155
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Miller had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the bank records. 156 Specifically, the
Court found that Miller voluntarily conveyed the records to the banks,
157
where the records would routinely be exposed to bank employees.
The Court found no fourth amendment prohibition against the
government's power to subpoena information so revealed to bank
employees despite Miller's likely assumption that the bank would not
58
betray his confidence.
Swift and severe criticism followed Miller. Although the Court
59
attempted to reconcile the Miller holding with Katz v. United States,1
the practical impact of the decision was to revive the proprietary
approach to determining when enforcement of a subpoena implicates
fourth amendment privacy concerns. 60 Commentators harshly, and
nearly uniformly, condemned Miller.'6 ' The Miller Court's myopic
view that maintaining a bank account constituted a choice rather
than a necessary prerequisite to participation in modern economic life
received particular criticism.162
155. Id.
156. 425 U.S. at 442.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 443.
159. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "[The premise that property interests control the right of the
Government to search and seize has been discredited." Fourth amendment concerns arise when
the government has "violated the privacy upon which [a person has] justifiably relied." Id. at
353.
160. Paul B. Rasor, Controlling Government Access to Personal Financial Records, 25
Washburn L. J. 417, 421 (1986).
161. For example, Professor LaFave described the decision as "unfortunate" and "dead
wrong." LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.7(c) at 509, 511 (cited in note 17). Judge Posner
noted that just because a bank customer exposes his financial records to bank employees, 'it
does not follow that he is indifferent to having those affairs broadcast to the world." Richard A.
Posner, The Economics of Justice 342 (Harvard U., 1981). He further stated that "[a] good sign
that the Court lacks sympathy for a type of claim is its use of inconsistent reasoning to deny it."
Id. at 343. Judge Posner's repudiation of the Miller case may implicitly underlie his decision in
Collins. See notes 48-54 and accompanying text. See also Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth
Amendment and the 'Legitimate Expectation of Privacy," 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1289, 1313-14 (1981)
(calling Miller "misguided'); Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment, 4 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1983) ("I have yet to encounter a law student with a kind
word to say about the opinion'; JoAnn Guzik, The Assumption of Risk Doctrine: Erosion of
Fourth Amendment Protection Through Fictitious Consent to Search and Seizure, 22 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 1051, 1072 (1982) (describingMiller as an "anomaly"); Francis Y- Pray, Comment,
A Bank Customer Has No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ofBank Records: United States v.
Miller, 14 San Diego L. Rev. 414, 434 (1977) ("[The opinion does not represent a formidable
contribution to the raison d'etre of the possession factor in privacy law'.
162. "The Court's assertion in Miller... is contrary to ... the realities of modem-day life."
LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.7(c) at 511 (cited in note 17). Miller was flatly inconsistent
with Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590 (1974), decided two years earlier
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The criticisms of Miller are particularly relevant to cases
restricting administrative subpoenas of personal financial records
from directors of failed financial institutions. Acceptance of these
criticisms means that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,
modern economic reality forecloses any realistic difference between
the privacy interest in personal financial records submitted to a
financial institution and those maintained at home. In either case,
the Fourth Amendment should provide some measure of protection
from governmental access to such records. Thus, Parks163 and similar
cases might be viewed as reflecting lower federal courts' skepticism of
the Miller holding. Accordingly, evaluation of the congressional
response to Miller-the Right to Financial Privacy Act (the

"Act") 64--is critical.
Unwilling to wait for a judicial reversal of Miller, Congress
responded to the intense criticism of the decision by creating a statutory right to privacy in personal banking records. 165 Signed into law
on November 10, 1978,166 the Right to Financial Privacy Act provides
by the California Supreme Court. Burrows was an attorney suspected of misappropriating a
client's funds. A police detective contacted several banks and obtained copies of Burrows's
financial records. Burrows was not notified of the detective's request for the documents, nor
were the documents procured pursuant to any warrant or other court process. Id. at 591. The
court held that the state's procurement of the bank records violated Burrows's rights under Art.
I, § 13 of the California Constitution, a provision essentially identical to the Fourth
Amendment. The court recognized that maintenance of bank accounts is a necessity, not a
choice, in the modern world.
For all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their
financial affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in
the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account. In the
course of such dealings, a depositor reveals many aspects of his personal affairs,
opinions, habits and associations.
Id. at 596. In its recognition of modern economic reality, the Burrows decision was far more
consistent with Katz than was Miller.
The Miller majority distinguished Burrows on the grounds that the bank records were
procured pursuant to an oral request by the detective rather than any legal process. Miller, 425
U.S. at 445 n.7. As Justice Brennan pointed out, however, the majority's holding did not rest on
a requirement that the subpoenas were defective. Id. at 448 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. 65 F.3d at 207.
164. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401 et seq. (1994 ed.).
165. The title is a congressional response to the Supreme Court decision in the [sic]
United States v. Miller which held that a customer of a financial institution has no
standing under the Constitution to contest Government access to financial records. The
Court did not acknowledge the sensitive nature of these records, and instead decided
that since the records are the "property" of the financial institution, the customer has no
constitutionally recognizable privacy interest in them.
Nevertheless, while the Supreme Court found no constitutional right of privacy in
financial records, it is clear that Congress may provide protection of individual rights
beyond that afforded in the Constitution.
Financial Institutions Regulatory Act of 1978, H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34
(1978).
166. Kirschner, 13 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 31 (cited in note 137).
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that personal financial records held by a financial institution may be
accessed by use of an administrative subpoena.167 Prior to issuing a
subpoena to a financial institution, an agency must notify the
customer and provide a description of the records sought, a statement
of the general purpose of the inquiry, and an explanation of the
customer's right to challenge the subpoena in court. 68 The customer
may then apply to a United States district court to quash the
subpoena on the grounds that the records are not "relevant to the
legitimate law enforcement inquiry" or that the agency has not
substantially complied with the requirements of the Act. 69 The
district court may quash the subpoena if it finds that (1) the law
enforcement inquiry is not legitimate, (2) the records are not relevant
to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry, or (3) the agency has not
70
substantially complied with the notice requirements of the Act.
The most striking aspect of the Act's review provision is its
virtual reproduction of the Powell test for determining whether an
administrative subpoena is valid on fourth amendment grounds.""
This codification of the Powell test is not surprising. Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court's characterization in Miller of the
fourth amendment implications of obtaining personal financial records from banks. In attempting to equate, via statute, records held
by banks with those directly held by the customer, Congress logically
looked to the prevailing fourth amendment test employed in administrative subpoena enforcement proceedings.172 One difference between the Act's review standard and the Powell test, however, is that
under the Act the party challenging the subpoena bears the burden of
initiating judicial review and stating the reasons for his or her belief
that the records are irrelevant to any legitimate law enforcement
inquiry. 17 Under the Powell test, the governmental agency bears the
initial burden of proof."14 Some commentators have criticized this
5
requirement as a significant weakness of the Act."1

167. 12 U.S.C. § 3405. Other means of access include customer authorization, id. § 3404,
search warrant, id. § 3406, judicial subpoena, id. § 3407, or 'Tormal written requests" if no
"administrative summons or subpoena authority appears available," id. § 3408.
168. Id. §§ 3405(2), 3406(b)-(c), 3407(2).
169. Id. § 3410(a).
170. Id. § 3410(c).
171. See note 42 and accompanying text.
172. See notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
173. 12 U.S.C. § 3410(a)(2).
174. See note 44 and accompanying text.
175. See, for example, Kirschner, 13 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 47-48 (cited in note 137).
Kirschner notes that "an earlier version of the Act provided customers with the same right as if
the records were in his possession." Id. at 47. In other words, the government would have
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The Right to Financial Privacy Act essentially codified scholarly criticism of the Miller Court's failure to recognize a fourth
amendment privacy interest in personal financial records held by a
bank. The Act itself has its critics. Arguably, the Act's failure to
place the burden on the government to prove that records sought are
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry causes it to fall short
76
of the fourth amendment protection provided for by the Powell test.
Even if the Act were amended to reverse the burden of proof, making
it in effect a codification of Powell, Parks would still present a
conundrum. The Act does not require the governmental agency to
articulate a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity in order to
subpoena the personal financial records. Thus, the Act appears
unconstitutional under the Parks holding. In other words, Congress's
attempt to provide more privacy protection for personal financial
records than the Miller Court held was constitutionally required is
unconstitutional.' 7 This logical absurdity could only be rectified if the
Court overruled Miller and accepted a distinction between personal
and corporate financial records for fourth amendment purposes,
7
which would apparently also require the reversal of Ryan. 8
This tortuous judicial path need not be taken. The Act is far
more doctrinally consistent with the Powell/Ryan line of cases than it
is with Parks.179 Congress attempted to provide consistency, albeit
imperfect, in the protection of private financial records by legislatively
reconciling the Miller fact pattern with the prevailing fourth
amendment jurisprudence ignored by the Miller Court. 189 The Act
borne the burden of demonstrating a reasonable relationship between the records sought and
the investigation. Such a requirement is consistent with Powell. The amendment shifting this
burden to the customer was likely a compromise to appease the Departments of Justice and the
Treasury, who vigorously opposed the Act. Id. at 26-31, 42 (discussing the legislative debates
surrounding the Act's passage).
176. See note 44 and accompanying text.
177. Congress clearly has the power to provide this additional privacy protection. Zurcher
u.Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978) ("Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not prevent
or advise against legislative... efforts to establish nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses).
178. See notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
179. "I'The title seeks to strike a balance between customers' right of privacy and the need
of law enforcement agencies to obtain financial records pursuant to legitimate investigations."
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383 at 33 (cited in note 165).
180. It is true that the Right to Financial Privacy Act defines a "customer" as a "person."
12 U.S.C. § 3401(5). A "person" is defined as "an individual or a partnership of five or fewer
individuals." Id. § 3401(4). Corporations are not within the ambit of the Act. PittsburghNatl.
Bank v. United States, 771 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir. 1985); Spa Flying Service, Inc. v. United States,
724 F.2d 95, 96 (8th Cir. 1984). Kirschner notes that earlier versions of the Act extended
protection to all customers-individuals, partnerships, corporations, trusts, and other legal
entities. Kirschner, 13 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 43 (cited in note 137). This fact lends some
credence to the distinction between corporate and personal records. However, rather than
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properly recognizes that maintaining bank accounts is a necessity
rather than a choice in modern economic life.181 In recognizing this
reality, the Act properly gives bank customers the right to challenge
an administrative subpoena for personal financial records and to have
the subpoena evaluated under the Powell standard. 182 Under this
standard, the reviewing court appropriately directs its attention to
the nature of the records subpoenaed, not the identity of the owner or
holder of the records. Congress's selection of the Powell standard of
review as the heightened protection due personal financial records
provides further evidence that privacy interests in such records are no
greater than those in corporate financial records. Courts grappling
with privacy issues surrounding administrative subpoena of personal
financial records should consider the Act as providing an important
framework in which to consider the issue.
4. Weighing Public and Private Interests-A Recalibration or a
Thumb on the Scales?
In addition to focusing on the nature of the records in subpoena enforcement, courts consider the scope and purpose of the
investigative power conferred upon the agency. 83 The importance of
the public interest advanced by the use of investigative power is
fundamental to this consideration. Public interests that appear to be
far less substantial than the public interest in resolving the savings
and loan crisis have trumped fourth amendment challenges to
disclosure of personal financial information.
Walls v. Petersburg' and Barry v. New York' 85 are instructive
on this point. In both cases, public employees challenged requirements that their financial background be disclosed as a means of
monitoring possible conflicts of interest and corruption. 1 1 The courts
viewing this amendment as reflecting congressional recognition of any doctrinal distinction
between corporate and personal financial records in supreme court cases, the failure to extend
universal protection is better explained by the political give and take required to pass the Act.
Id. at 42. See discussion in note 175. Even if one accepts this distinction as continuing to exist
under the Act, it is at least instructive that Congress selected the Powell criteria as the
"heightened" amount of protection due natural persons.
181. See note 162 and accompanying text.
182. See O'Brien, 467 U.S. at 745.
183. See note 119 and accompanying text.
184. 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).
185. 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983).
186. The plaintiff in Walls challenged a requirement that she fill out a background check
questionnaire requiring disclosure of financial information as a condition of employment with a
"Community Diversion Incentive Program" operated by the City of Petersburg's Bureau of
Police. Walls, 895 F.2d at 190. The Barry plaintiffs challenged a New York City ordinance
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rejected the fourth amendment challenges in each case, holding that
the public interest in preventing corruption or conflict of interest at
the local level outweighed personal privacy concerns associated with
disclosure of the financial information. 187 Each court acknowledged

that the public disclosure requirements were potentially
"embarrassing and highly intrusive."'8 Each city's implementation of
a mechanism designed to limit redisclosure of the financial records,
however, convinced the court to require the employees to comply with
the disclosure requirements.189 Courts may also employ compliance

orders containing disclosure limitations as a means of balancing
agency investigative needs with confidentiality concerns. 90
Courts have permitted agencies to investigate records that are
more sensitive than financial records by drafting orders that strictly
limit the right of access to the records. In St. Luke's Regional Medical
Center, Inc. v. United States,191 the Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") investigated a staff physician for Medicaid fraud. In
the process of the investigation, HHS subpoenaed many of the
physician's medical records.192 Finding that the government's interest
in exposing Medicaid fraud outweighed the physician's privacy
interests in the records, the court ordered the physician to comply
with the subpoena.193 Recognizing the sensitive nature of the
documents, however, the court ordered that redisclosure of the records to third parties, including state agencies, not occur without
further court approval. 9 4
St. Luke's followed the holding of United States v.
95 in which the court ordered
Westinghouse Electric Corporation,1
Westinghouse's custodian of records to comply with a National

requiring certain city employees to file annual reports disclosing financial information. Barry,

712 F.2d at 1556.
187. Walls, 895 F.2d at 194; Barry, 712 F.2d at 1560.
188. Barry, 712 F.2d at 1561. See Walls, 895 F.2d at 192-93.
189. The City of Petersburg kept the questionnaires in a locked file cabinet accessible by
only four people. Walls, 895 F.2d at 194. The New York City Board of Ethics could deny an
inspection request of publicly disclosed financial records if the Board determined that the
requester was not acting in good faith or was seeking to obtain the information for an improper
purpose. Barry, 712 F.2d at 1562.
190. See, for example, EEOC v. C&P Telephone Co., 813 F. Supp. 874, 876 (D.D.C. 1993).
The need for confidentiality is not a valid basis for refusing to comply with an administrative
subpoena. "A court may, however, impose various conditions on disclosure of confidential
information to an administrative agency." Id.
191. 717 F.Supp. 665 (N.D. Iowa 1989).
192. Id. at 666.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 667.
195. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
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Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") subpoena for
employee medical records. 19 In determining that the government's
interest in researching health and safety on the jobsite outweighed
privacy concerns, the court developed a lengthy list of factors to be
considered when balancing the competing interests. 197 Noticeably
absent from the list was any consideration of whether the records are
owned by a corporation or an individual. Indeed, in this case, it would
be absurd to suggest that the medical records were any less sensitive
merely because Westinghouse, rather than a natural person, owned
them. No patient would be less concerned about public disclosure of
his medical records just because his employer owned the records. 198 In
its compliance order, however, the court required NIOSH to notify
employees whose records were sought and to permit the affected
employees to challenge the subpoena on personal grounds. 199
Parks is remarkable for its failure to consider orders limiting
redisclosure of financial records by the agency. The court specifically
considered the public interest in resolving the savings and loan crisis,
and dismissed it as subordinate to the privacy interests in the
records.200 Congress has placed the cost of bailing out the savings and
loan industry at as much as $500 billion. 201 Furthermore, the Parks
court failed to consider the broader public concern with preventing
bank failures. Such failures are often the result of fraud and selfdealing by insiders. Many banking laws are aimed at preventing this

196. Id. at 580.
197. Id. at 578. The factors included: the type of record requested; the information the
record contains or might contain; the potential for harm in any subsequent non-consensual
disclosure; the potential for injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was
generated; the adequacy of safeguards; the degree of need for access; and any express statutory
mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward
access. Id.
198. Further illustration of this point is found in University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at
182. The EEOC subpoenaed confidential peer review materials in an investigation of charges of
racial and sexual harassment. Id. at 186. The Court enforced the subpoena, noting that failing
to allow such disclosure would "place a substantial litigation-producing obstacle in the way of
the Commission's efforts to investigate and remedy alleged discrimination." Id. at 194. No
mention was made of the fact that the records were owned by the University rather than an
individual. As in Westinghouse, these records were equally sensitive regardless of the owner.
Compare the criticisms of Miller discussed in notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
199. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 581. The similarity of this order to the requirements of the
Right to Financial Privacy Act is unmistakable. See notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, the St. Luke's court omitted such a restriction from its order. 717 F. Supp. at 66465.
200. Parks,65 F.3d at 214.
201. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990, H.R. Rep. No. 101-681 (Part I), 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., 69 (1990).
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type of activity.202 It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to see how
this interest is not at least as substantial as the prevention of corruption in local government and investigation of Medicaid fraud. The
Parks court appears to have placed its thumb on the personal side of
the judicial scale in weighing the respective personal and governmental interests.203 It is unclear whether this balance would have come
out differently had the court considered its power to limit redisclosure
as a means of respecting the privacy concerns associated with financial disclosure. If the court used this equitable power, it would not
need to inject a vague articulable suspicion requirement for the
subpoena of personal financial records-a standard that cases have
already shown will be applied by different courts with little
consistency.204
C. Striking the Balance With ExistingProtectionsin Subpoena
Enforcement
The unprecedented heightened suspicion requirement for
enforcement of administrative subpoenas for personal financial records and the consistent failure to consider redisclosure limitations to
protect privacy interests in such records suggests deep judicial
distrust of agency investigative power. This Section discusses the
criticisms leveled at the OTS's and the RTC's investigative techniques
and how these criticisms may have impacted judicial decisions
restricting
administrative
subpoena
enforcement.
While
acknowledging these criticisms as valid concerns, this Section
contends that existing enforcement and redisclosure limitations are
sufficient to protect subpoena targets.
Parks's doctrinal inconsistency may be explained by judicial
suspicion of the competency and motives of governmental inspectors
charged with resolving the savings and loan crisis. The Resolution
Trust Corporation ("RTC")20 5 and the Office of Thrift Supervision

202. Collective action problems limit shareholders' incentives to monitor self-dealing. The
moral hazard presented by the availability of FDIC insurance for depositors encourages insiders
to take undue risks in the management of financial institutions. Jonathan R. Macey and
Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures,Risk Monitoring,and the Market for Bank Control, 88 Colum.
L. Rev. 1153, 1166-69; Alexander, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1752-54 (cited in note 99).
203. Note that in McVane and Wentz, the Second and Third Circuits, respectively,
acknowledged the tremendous public interest in resolution of the savings and loan crisis as
outweighing the personal interest in confidentiality of financial records. McVane, 44 F.3d at
1136; Wentz, 55 F.3d at 909.
204. Compare Parks, 65 F.3d at 213-14, with Wentz, 55 F.3d at 909.
205. See note 62 and accompanying text.
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("OTS")20 have been bitterly criticized for the manner in which they
have carried out the mandates of FIRREA.27 At least one commentator made the disturbing suggestion that heavy handed enforcement
tactics drove an officer of a savings and loan to commit suicide. 208
Critics have described the agencies as engaging in a "witch-hunt"20 9
aimed at persecuting innocent persons simply because they served on
the board of directors of an insured institution.210

Such sentiments

may underlie the Parks majority's fear of what Judge Selya referred
as "minions of an administrative
to in his dissent
agency... roam[ing] at will, like a herd of zebra on the veldt, through
Such concern is
an individual's personal papers or effects.211
perfectly reasonable, but it can be addressed under existing law.
Subpoena targets asked to turn over personal financial records
may force the agency to justify the subpoena to a federal district court
judge before the subpoena can be enforced. If, as the Parks court
suggests, the real purpose of these types of subpoenas is harassment,
the court may refuse to enforce them by striking the subpoena under
206. The OTS was also created as part of FIRREA. 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(a). The Director of
the OTS has the power to "provide for the examination, safe and sound operation, and
regulation of savings associations. Id. § 1463(a)(1).
207. See, for example, James T. Pitts, Eric W. Bloom, and Monique M. Vasilchik,
FDICIRTC Suits Against Bank and Thrift Officers and Directors-Why Now, What's Left?, 63
Fordham L. Rev. 2087 (1995); Mollie Dickenson, The Real S&L Scandal, Worth 92 (Sept. 1994).
Criticism has also been levelled from the bench. See Wachtel v. OTS, 982 F.2d 581, 586 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (criticizing the OTS's broad interpretation of its statutory authority as "attributable
not so much to creative lawyering as to excessive zeal').
208. Dickenson, Worth at 92 (cited in note 207). Dickenson's article details how Scott Cone,
the Chief Financial Officer of Landmark Land Co., was driven to despair by the OTS's relentless
investigative tactics. Mr. Cone shot himself while wearing a T-shirt emblazoned with a logo
featuring the letters RTC circled and slashed through in red. Id. Mr. Cone was eventually
cleared of all wrongdoing. Id. at 102.
209. Id. at 97.
210. Pitts, Bloom, and Vasilchik, 63 Fordham L. Rev. at 2088 (cited in note 207). This
criticism suggests an argument in favor of Parks. Allowing agencies to subpoena directors' and
officers' financial records is disruptive and potentially expensive for the targets. Conceivably,
the disruption caused by these subpoenas could deter qualified candidates from seeking positions as directors and officers of financial institutions. This concern may be overstated,
however, given the standard corporate practice of indemnifying and insuring directors and
officers. See Robert C. Clark, CorporateLaw § 15.10.3 at 673-74 (Little, Brown, 1986). Since
the mid-1980s, however, director and officer ('D&O") insurers have begun including a
"regulatory exclusion" in their policies. Peter D. Rosenthal, Note, Have Bank Regulators Been
Missing the Forestfor the Public Policy Tree?: The Case for Contract-BasedArguments in the
Litigation of the Regulatory Exclusions in Directorand Officer Liability Policies, 75 B.U. L. Rev.
155, 155 (1995). These exclusions, however, present in over half of D&O liability policies, deny
coverage for "any action brought 'by or on behalf of' a governmental regulatory agency."' Id.
D&Os have been successful in persuading some courts to declare some regulatory exclusions
unenforceable as against public policy. Since 1989, though, courts have been unsympathetic to
this type of claim. Id. at 156-57. If the courts continue to enforce these regulatory exclusions,
qualified candidates will face a disincentive to accept a D&O position. See id. at 183.
211. Parks, 65 F.3d at 217 (Selya, J., dissenting).
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the Powell test's prohibition of using the subpoena power for an improper purpose. 212 While a subpoena target "bears a heavy burden" in
convincing the court that the subpoena has been issued for an
improper purpose, 213 the burden can be met when a target is being
harassed. 214 Refusal to enforce a subpoena on harassment grounds

would provide relief for subpoena targets in extreme cases of agency
abuse. Nonetheless, refusal to enforce subpoenas on these grounds
should remain a rare occurrence. Otherwise, the courts will garner a
supervisory role in agency investigation that is incompatible with the
assignment of investigative power to agencies.215
Even if the agency satisfies the four-prong Powell test 2 8 for
enforcement of its subpoena, courts can and should routinely restrict
redisclosure of the financial information in the enforcement order. 217
Such restrictions will protect the privacy interests of the subpoena
target and preserve the investigative power of the agency. Ignoring
this type of protection in favor of the vague, malleable articulable
suspicion requirement threatens to hinder not only the investigative
effectiveness of the RTC, OTS, and FDIC, but also the effectiveness of
all federal agencies charged with investigating possible wrongdoing by
individuals. The only way to avoid such interference is some sort of
judicial determination that certain agencies, such as the IRS or SEC,
212. Ernst & Young, 786 F. Supp. at 50. See note 42 and accompanying text.
213. Knopfler, 658 F.2d at 26.
214. Examples of refusal to enforce a subpoena on harassment grounds may be found in the
grand jury context. See In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1984). A party
seeking to quash a grand jury subpoena on harassment grounds also faces a difficult task. The
government need only refute charges of harassment "to the extent the witness has supplied
evidence to support them." Conclusive and speculative claims of harassment will not succeed.
In re Chinske, 785 F. Supp. 130, 132 (D. Mont. 1991). In addition, conclusory affidavits issued
by the government stating that the grand jury subpoena is not intended as harassment may
occasionally satisfy the government's burden in refuting charges of harassment. In re Grand
Jury, 619 F.2d 1022, 1028 (3d Cir. 1980). Presumably, this light governmental burden would
suffice only when the target's claims of harassment were similarly conclusory. The courts'
reluctance to quash subpoenas on harassment grounds stems from a reluctance to "unduly
interfere with the independence of the grand jury and the prosecutor." Chinske, 785 F. Supp. at
133.
Nonetheless, subpoena targets are occasionally successful. For example, in one challenge
several individuals were indicted in a state court for various drug-related offenses. In the
interim, a federal grand jury began investigating the defendants for violations of federal laws.
During the investigation, the grand jury subpoenaed the defendants' attorneys to testify. Grand
Jury Matters, 751 F.2d at 15. The First Circuit held that the district court had not abused its
discretion in quashing these subpoenas on harassment grounds. Id. at 19. One state court held
that a county district attorney's grand jury subpoena of records related to an annexation dispute
amounted to harassment. The annexation dispute did not involve any possible violation of laws
by the subpoena target. Gher v. District Court, 183 Colo. 316, 516 P.2d 643, 644 (1973).
215. See notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
216. See note 42 and accompanying text.
217. See notes 190-204 and accompanying text.
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are somehow less likely to harass an investigative target. What
factors would go into making such a determination is anyone's guess.
Furthermore, in addition to the inconsistent application of the
articulable suspicion requirement in different jurisdictions,218 one can
easily envision circuit splits developing over which agencies merit less
scrutiny of their subpoena enforcement actions. The most rational
approach to subpoenas for personal financial records, therefore, is
consistent application of the Powell criteria and employment of
protective orders.
A license is "permission by a competent authority to do an act
which, without such permission would be illegal... or otherwise not
allowable."219 The Parks decision and others like it appear to take the
position that fishing into personal financial records by agencies is
illegal or not allowable. These decisions seem to regard enforcement
of such subpoenas under the Powell test as a "fishing license" under
which courts act as the "competent authority" granting permission to
engage into this otherwise forbidden activity. Subpoenaing personal
financial records, however, is certainly not a forbidden activity.
Viewing this use of the subpoena power as forbidden undermines
agency investigative power and runs contrary to precedent.20
Subpoena enforcement proceedings and protective orders sufficiently
balance the competing public and private concerns in agency
investigations. Furthermore, these proceedings avoid requiring an
agency to "hitch the horse in front of the cart"22' by meeting a vague
and malleable articulable suspicion requirement before proceeding
with its statutory duties.

218. See note 204 and accompanying text.
219. Black's Law Dictionary920 (West, 6th ed. 1990).
220. Schwimmer, 232 F.2d at 862-63 ("Some exploration or fishing necessarily is inherent
and entitled to exist in all documentary productions sought by a grand jury'. The court in In re
Alleged ProhibitedPoliticalActivity, 443 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1977), may have summed up
the law most succinctly.
[E]ven if I were to conclude that the Commission was attempting "in this case to cast
twenty-two 'deposition' subpoenas in the hope that they may, when interwoven, serve as
a 'fishing net' to catch a violator," it is clear from the case law interpreting the p6wers of
similar agencies that the Commission was legally within its authority to do so since the
information sought is relevant and the inquiry is within the authority of the agency.
Id. at 1199 (citations omitted).
221. Parks,65 F.3d at 218 (Selya, J., dissenting).
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IV. USING SUBPOENA POWER TO DETERMINE COST-EFFECTIVENESS:
IMPERMISSIBLE PURPOSE OR INHERENT AGENCY POWER?

As mentioned above, there are two grounds for recent judicial
resistance to use of the administrative subpoena power to obtain
personal financial records. The first ground is the drawing of a privacy distinction between personal and corporate financial records.
The second ground, discussed in this Part, is judicial questioning of
the legitimacy of using administrative subpoenas to determine
whether proceedings against the target would be cost-effective. Some
decisions have held that issuing administrative subpoenas to assess
the cost-effectiveness of enforcement actions is impermissible.222
Other decisions, most notably Walde, have held that this use of the
subpoena power is not per se impermissible although it does require
that the agency demonstrate an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing
before such a subpoena will be enforced. 223 This Part contends that
cost-effectiveness should always be considered a proper investigative
purpose unless explicitly precluded by statute. Specifically, this Part
argues that subpoenaing financial information to determine the costeffectiveness of enforcement actions is necessary to allow an agency to
set an enforcement agenda that best utilizes limited budgetary
resources.
A. Statutory Construction-ANeed to Considerthe Big Picture
The battle over the use of administrative subpoenas to assess
cost-effectiveness is largely waged on the field of statutory construction.224 Generally, the courts liberally interpret an agency's statutory

authority to subpoena information pursuant to an investigation. 225
This approach to statutory interpretation results from the perceived
importance of the public need for agencies to possess broad
investigative power. 226

222. See Freese, 837 F. Supp. at 24-25; Resolution Trust Corp. v. Feffer, 793 F. Supp. 11, 1415 (D.D.C. 1992).
223. Frates, 61 F.3d at 964-65; Sealed Case, 42 F.3d at 1416; Thornton, 41 F.3d at 1544;
Walde, 18 F.3d at 949.
224. Walde, 18 F.3d at 948; Federal Trade Commn. v. Turner, 609 F.2d 743, 745 (5th Cir.
1980).
225. LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure § 4.13(b) at 367 (cited in note 17).
226. Cooper, 60 Mich. L. Rev. at 189 (cited in note 45). Professor Cooper suggests, however, that the broad or restrictive interpretation of an agency's investigative power often turns
on the court's opinion "as to the social desirability of empowering a particular agency to obtain a
certain type of information under the stated circumstances." Id. at 190. Be that as it may, most
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In Federal Trade Commn. v. Turner,227 the FTC issued a

subpoena to determine whether the subject of a cease and desist order
had sufficient financial resources to make a civil action for consumer
redress cost-effective. 22 8 The FTC argued that its statutory grant of

broad investigative and enforcement power necessarily included the
ability to subpoena financial information in order to determine costeffectiveness. 22 9

Notwithstanding the judicial tendency to read

statutes conferring investigative power broadly,230 the Fifth Circuit
held that the FTC's investigative authority was limited to
The court
determining whether consumers had been wronged.
deemed the financial condition of the investigative target irrelevant to
that purpose.

231

In Walde, the RTC employed a similar statutory construction
argument but gained a partial victory. The RTC pointed to three
provisions of FIRREA directing the RTC to minimize losses to depositors while acting as conservator of a failed savings and loan.232

Despite a relatively clear statutory mandate, 23 the D.C. Circuit reluctantly acknowledged the RTC's authority to use subpoenas to determine whether an enforcement action would be cost-effective.
Concerned that Congress had not really intended "so intrusive a grant
of authority,"23 the court held that the RTC "must have at least an

articulable suspicion that a former officer or director is liable" before

decisions in recent times have supported broad agency investigative authority. See notes 44-47
and accompanying text.
227. 609 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1980).
228. Id. at 744.
229. Id. Specifically, the FTC relied on various sections of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1994 ed.). Section 46(a) grants the FTC authority to investigate
activities of those engaged in interstate commerce. Section 49 authorizes the FTC to subpoena
documents relating to such investigations. Finally, Section 45 authorizes the FTC to initiate
proceedings against an investigative target. See Turner, 609 F.2d at 744.
230. See Turner, 609 F.2d at 747 (Brown, J., dissenting) (discussing the evolution of broad
administrative power).
231. Id. at 745-46.
232. The RTC is directed to "minimize[ I the amount of any loss realized in the resolution of
cases." 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(iv) (1994). In addition, the RTC must "conserve the assets
and property of the ... institution." Id. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(iv). Finally, the RTC may issue
subpoenas "for purposes of carrying out any power, authority or duty with respect to an insured
depository institution." Id. § 1821(d)(2)(I)(i). The RTC failed to argue that yet another statutory
provision supports its argument. While satisfying the obligations to an institution's depositors,
the RTC must determine that "the total amount of the expenditures by the Corporation and
obligations incurred by the Corporation... is the least costly to the deposit insurance fund of all
possible methods for meeting the Corporation's obligation." Id. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii).
233. The RTC's statutory argument was certainly more persuasive than the FTC's in
Turner. The FTC was unable to point to any language specifically directing the agency to
minimize losses. Turner, 609 F.2d at 744.
234. Walde, 18 F.3d at 949.
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enforcing a subpoena designed to assess the cost-effectiveness of an
235
enforcement action.

This holding is unsatisfactory. The heightened suspicion
requirement suggests that the D.C. Circuit created a middle ground
position. The choice, however, should be binary: the use of the
subpoena power to assess cost-effectiveness is either permissible or
If, as the court seems to suggest, the use is
impermissible.
impermissible, it is difficult to see how attaching a heightened
suspicion requirement makes it more palatable. Again, the court
seems to regard the use as generally impermissible, but subject to
special permissive use upon court approval. As discussed earlier, this
view of the subpoena power as a "license" is simply incorrect.23
Perhaps uncomfortable with the rather narrow statutory interpretation employed in Walde, the D.C. Circuit has subsequently
turned the articulable suspicion requirement into a paper tiger. The
court will now enforce a subpoena seeking personal financial
information in order to assess cost-effectiveness, so long as the RTC
states an alternative basis for the subpoena.237 For example, in
Frates, the D.C. Circuit enforced a subpoena aimed at assessing costeffectiveness because the RTC also claimed that the subpoena was
relevant to determining potential liability and the need to avoid asset
transfers by the target. 2-

Commentators hostile to the RTC have

criticized these subsequent decisions as eliminating any check on
administrative power created in Walde.239 One commentator noted

that the RTC's attempts to connect personal financial information
with wrongdoing are often tenuous. 240 Employment of these strained
24 1
connections threatens to undermine the credibility of the agency.

235. Id.
236. See notes 219-21 and accompanying text. The court's Turner-like holding is also
somewhat mystifying given the D.C. Circuit's criticism of Turner in Federal Trade Commn. v.
Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The court characterized the Turner
rejection of cost-effectiveness subpoenas as "mere dictum," neither explained nor justified by the
court's opinion. Id. at 1089. The Walde court attempted to reconcile its decision with Invention
Submission by resorting to the recently popular, but questionable, distinction between corporate
and personal financial records. The target of the subpoena in Invention Submission was a
corporation. Id. at 1087. See Part III for criticism of the distinction between corporate and
personal records.
237. In Frates, the court held that "the RTC must demonstrate an articulable suspicion
only where it subpoenas personal financial information 'for the sole purpose of determining the
subpoenaed person's net worth.'" 61 F.3d at 964-65 (quoting Walde, 18 F.3d at 944).
238. Id. at 965.
239. See Pitts, Bloom, and Vesilchik, 63 Fordham L. Rev. at 2101 (cited in note 207)

(describing Walde as "rife with loopholes").
240. Vartanian, Ledig, and Marquardt, 12 Banking Policy Rep. at 16 (cited in note 70).
241. Id.
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Acceptance of such strained theories in subpoena enforcement actions
also reflects poorly on the courts.
The reluctance to recognize this type of subpoena authority
appears to stem primarily from judicial discomfort with allowing
agencies to assess the cost-effectiveness of enforcement action when
private civil litigants cannot do so under discovery rules.242 Reference

to

the

discovery rules

governing

civil

actions,

however,

is

unwarranted in administrative subpoena enforcement.243 In addition,

the courts have overlooked the traditional judicial deference to an
agency's setting of an enforcement agenda. This traditional deference
provides a sound doctrinal basis for recognizing that the power to
assess cost-effectiveness via subpoena power is inherent in any statutory grant of administrative investigative power.
B. (Mis)GuidanceFrom the FederalRules of Civil Procedure
Private civil litigants are not ordinarily permitted to discover a
defendant's financial status since such information is rarely relevant
to the merits of the action.244 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, do not restrict or control administrative subpoenas .245
Despite the clear inapplicability of the rules to administrative subpoenas, courts and commentators have continued to look to them by
analogy for purposes of restricting administrative subpoena power.
The Turner246 court found that when an agency contemplates
initiation of an enforcement action, it effectively becomes a civil plaintiff.247 As such, the prohibition of pre-trial discovery of a defendant's
financial condition becomes applicable to the agency. 248 Importantly,

the FTC had not filed civil charges against the subpoena target. 249
The Turner court did not specify when contemplation of an enforce242. See Part IV.B.
243. See id.
244. Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 479-80 (10th Cir. 1974); Ranney-Brown
Distributors,Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Industries., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5 (S.D. Ohio 1977). An exception
to this prohibition is the ability to discover financial information to aid in executing a judgment.
F.R.C.P. 69. The Second Circuit has held, however, that Rule 69's limitation of discovery of
financial information to enforcement of judgments does not limit a federal agency's statutory
authority to issue subpoenas for such information. United States v. Kulukundis, 329 F.2d 197,
199 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (finding that a subpoena issued by the IRS pursuant to § 7602 of
the Internal Revenue Code was not limited by Rule 69).
245. Bowles v. Bay of New York Coal & Supply Corp., 152 F.2d 330, 331 (2d Cir. 1945).
246. For a detailed discussion of the Turner fact pattern, see notes 227-31 and
accompanying text.
247. Turner, 609 F.2d at 745.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 744.

1996]

ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS

433

ment action is sufficiently concrete to justify the imposition of pretrial discovery limitations on the federal agency. The broadest reading of the case would make the federal civil discovery rules applicable
to all agencies with civil enforcement power because any agency investigation would likely include contemplation of an enforcement
action. Such a reading would severely hamper agency investigative
250
power.
Turner's contemplation of a gray area in which an agency is
effectively, but not actually, a civil litigant251 probably reflects judicial
discomfort with the use of subpoenas to assess cost-effectiveness.252
One commentator critical of these types of subpoenas noted that all
civil litigants would love to assess the financial condition of the opposing party for strategic purposes, but are prohibited from doing so by
the federal rules.253
The bootstrapping of pre-trial discovery limitations into
administrative subpoena enforcement fails to consider the broader
public interest in the missions of agencies. 254 The regulatory mission
of many, if not most, agencies is enormous. 255 Accomplishing these
missions requires efficient allocation of limited resources. Certainly,
when a civil plaintiff brings an action against an insolvent defendant,
some public funds are arguably wasted-namely litigation costs. If
that plaintiff is injured and unable to collect a judgment, additional

250. This interpretation may explain the D.C. Circuit's criticism of the Turner holding in
Invention Submission. Invention Submission, 965 F.2d at 1089. See note 236.
251. "Il?]he Court characterizes the litigative posture of the Commission as merely akin to
an individual plaintiff rather than a consumer watchdog." 609 F.2d at 746 (Brown, J.,
dissenting). Specific fact patterns may, of course, avoid this gray area. For example, in
Thornton, the RTC sought to subpoena financial records from a partnership to determine the
cost-effectiveness of bringing an enforcement action. 41 F.3d at 1541. The RTC had already
filed suit against the partnership. Id. Judge Edwards, writing for the majority, held that the
purpose of ascertaining the cost-effectiveness of bringing an action terminates upon filing of the
action. Id. at 1546. In such a case, the agency is truly a litigant and should not be able to endrun around the discovery limitations of the federal rules. Of course, the practical result of such
a holding is to encourage the issuance of such subpoenas prior to actually bringing the
action-the issue under discussion here. This Note concludes that this proactive use of the
subpoena power should be allowed. An agency's waiting until an action has already been filed
before issuing a cost-effectiveness subpoena of financial records, on the other hand, smacks of
harassment rather than the legitimate setting of an enforcement agenda.
252. See Freese,837 F. Supp. at 24 (citing Turner with approval).
253. Pitts, Bloom, and Vasilchik, 63 Fordham L. Rev. at 2095 (cited in note 207). The
Federal Rules are not entirely opposed to the strategic use of a party's financial information.
Pre-trial discovery may include any insurance agreements under which the party may satisfy all
or part of a judgment. F.R.C.P. 26(b)(2).
254. Turner,609 F.2d at 753 (Brown, J., dissenting).
255. For example, the FDIC and RTC were vested with oversight responsibility for some
754 thrifts holding $428.3 billion in assets designated by Congress as insolvent or troubled.
Pitts, Bloom, and Vesilchik, 63 Fordham L. Rev. at 2092 (cited in note 207).
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public costs could be incurred by way of public assistance to the plaintiff. Thus, similar public cost risks arise in preventing pre-trial discovery of a defendant's financial condition and barring administrative
subpoena of similar information. The magnitude of the public cost
risks, however, differs greatly. Because of the substantially greater
public cost risk posed by inefficient allocation of an agency's limited
resources, courts should allow agencies to subpoena personal financial
records in order to assess the cost-effectiveness of administrative
enforcement actions.
In conclusion, rather than analogizing these subpoenas to pretrial discovery, courts should allow enforcement of administrative
subpoenas to determine cost-effectiveness. This approach reflects the
traditional judicial deference to an administrative agency's absolute
discretion to set an enforcement agenda.
C. Cost-Effectiveness Subpoenas as a Necessary Tool for Setting
an Enforcement Agenda
The Administrative Procedure Act precludes judicial review of
action committed to agency discretion by law.256

This exception to

judicial review is narrow and seldom recognized. 257 Some types of
administrative decisions, however, are "traditionally regarded as
committed to agency discretion. ' 258 Such decisions include whether to
take enforcement action 59 and how to allocate funds from a lump-sum
appropriation. 260 Both types of decisions require an agency to balance
numerous non-legal factors. 261 Courts deem it "unseemly" to secondguess an agency official's judgment in balancing these factors because
the agency has greater competence than the court in engaging in such
256.
257.
258.
259.

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994 ed.).
MCorp v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402, 1410 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (1993).
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1984). In Heckler, death row inmates brought

an action against the Food and Drug Administration. The inmates claimed that the use of
certain drugs in lethal injections was unapproved and thus violated the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act. Id. at 823.
260. Lincoln, 113 S.Ct. at 2031. In Lincoln, handicapped Indian children challenged the
Indian Health Service's decision to cease finding the Indian Children's Program from a lumpsum annual appropriation. Id. at 2027-29.
261. The agency must decide "whether agency resources are best spent on [one action] or
another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement
action requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has
enough resources to undertake the action at all." Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831. "[C]ourts have been
especially inclined to regard as unreviewable those aspects of agency decisions that involve a
considerable degree of expertise or experience, or that are based upon economic projections and
cost analyses." Local 2855, AFGE (AFL-CIO) v. United States, 602 F.2d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 1979)
(emphasis added).
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balancing.262 Using administrative subpoenas to assess the costeffectiveness of an enforcement action provides a means by which
agencies can intelligently set enforcement agendas designed to
accomplish regulatory missions efficiently.
The reason that courts do not review discretionary actions is
that the nature of such decisions is not amenable to judicial scrutiny.263 The use of administrative subpoenas as a means of making

discretionary decisions effectively does not itself qualify as a
discretionary activity. An agency cannot carry out discretionary
activities in an unconstitutional manner; 264 the courts are competent
to determine whether an administrative subpoena should be
enforced.265 In making these determinations, however, courts should
recognize that frequent refusal to enforce subpoenas aimed at
assessing cost-effectiveness will undermine an agency's ability to set
an intelligent, efficient enforcement agenda. Recent decisions placing
heightened suspicion requirements on these subpoenas or dismissing
their use altogether26 fail to address this interest.
The D.C. Circuit has even been reluctant to permit OTS's use
of administrative subpoenas seeking personal financial information in
order to assess an appropriate monetary penalty against a director or
officer of a failed savings and loan institution, despite clear statutory
authority to do so. 26 7 Restriction of this use of the subpoena power

compounds OTS's difficulties in minimizing the losses to depositors of
these institutions.268
These agencies may expend tremendous
resources in pursuing an investigative target only to find the target
unable to return any assets to the institution or pay a civil money
penalty. The agency loses, and, more importantly, the depositors of
the institution lose. Agency resources for recovering illegally
transferred funds have been depleted, with no resultant recovery, so
262. Local 2855, 602 F.2d at 579.
263. There is "no law to apply" in scrutinizing these decisions. Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410 (1971).
264. Davis Enterprisesv. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181, 1185 (3d Cir. 1989).
265. See discussion in Part HA.
266. See notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
267. Sealed Case, 42 F.3d at 1417. This use of the subpoena power would be consistent

with a civil plaintiffs discovery of a defendant's fmancial condition where the plaintiff seeks
punitive damages. Compare Miller v. Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 76 F.R.D. 136, 140 (W.D. Okla. 1977)
( Where punitive damages are claimed, it has been generally held that the Defendant's financial
condition is relevant to the subject matter of the action and is thus a proper subject of pretrial
discovery"). This similarity should make use of the subpoena power in such cases more
acceptable, or at least familiar, to the courts. See Part IV.B (discussing courts' tendencies to
analogize to pre-trial discovery limitations during administrative subpoena enforcement
proceedings).
268. See note 232.
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that fewer resources remain to pursue other targets who may be able
to return assets to the institution and its depositors. This restrictive
version of investigative authority limits the agency's ability to set an
efficient enforcement agenda to picking random investigative targets
until agency resources dry up, hoping that some targets will actually
be able to return assets to the failed institutions. This roulette wheel
approach to enforcement wastes agency and taxpayer dollars. Only
by taking a peek at an agency's enforcement agenda and requiring
less articulable suspicion for a particularly high priority target could
prohibits this
judicial review avoid this roulette wheel. Yet Heckler
269
judicial review of an agency's enforcement agenda.
For this reason, the traditional deference granted to an
agency's setting of an enforcement agenda and allocation of funds
should include a recognition that assessment of the cost-effectiveness
of an enforcement action is a permissible, even desirable, use of
administrative subpoena power. Enforcement proceedings reviewing
these subpoenas under the Powell standard will sufficiently safeguard
individuals from harassment and undue invasion of privacy.270 Fear
of overzealous use of the subpoena power is overstated. Agencies
facing resource constraints in carrying out regulatory missions are
unlikely to waste scarce resources by issuing these subpoenas in a
random fashion. Targets of these subpoenas would likely be under
some suspicion of wrongdoing by the agency.
The vague requirement of setting forth an articulable suspicion
of wrongdoing poses a problem, however. Given the standard's
vagueness and potential for inconsistent application, a court hostile to
administrative agencies271 might consistently refuse to enforce these
subpoenas. An agency might then have to resort to the unacceptable
roulette wheel method of investigation. If the manner in which such
subpoenas are issued indicates that the agency has engaged in
harassment, the court remains free to refuse to enforce the subpoena
2
on that ground. 72
Congress clearly possesses the power to curb particular exercises of agency enforcement power. Congress may accomplish this
end by setting an agency's priorities statutorily or otherwise limiting
the agency's discretion in setting a regulatory agenda.273 Thus,
269.
270.
271.
text.
272.
273.

See note 259 and accompanying text.
See discussion in Part III.C.
For example, the Parks or Freese courts. See notes 55-60, 73-79, and accompanying
See note 212 and accompanying text.
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833.
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Congress may choose to deny an administrative agency the power to
subpoena financial records to determine the cost-effectiveness of an
enforcement action. Until such time, courts should recognize that this
power reflects a permissible investigative purpose consistent with
traditional deference to an agency's discretion in setting a regulatory
agenda.

V. CONCLUSION

Courts struck the fourth amendment balance between competing public and private interests in administrative subpoena power
long ago. Reduced to a four prong test in Powell,274 the balance tilted
toward a broad subpoena power so that administrative agencies could
carry out their important regulatory missions with a minimum of
judicial supervision. Yet, protections still exist for the target of an
administrative subpoena. Administrative agencies cannot enforce
their own subpoenas. The courts remain an important check on
agencies, preventing them from exceeding their statutory authority or
using subpoena power for impermissible purposes such as
harassment.
Nonetheless, distrust of agency investigative power remains,
as evidenced by recent decisions placing additional judicial checks on
the subpoena power. Most significantly, a number of decisions have
an
balancing test
where
an
individualized
reintroduced
administrative subpoena seeks personal financial records. Vague
restrictions such as requiring an agency to demonstrate an articulable
suspicion of wrongdoing by the subpoena target place the courts in a
This oversight
supervisory role in administrative investigation.
threatens to force agencies to carry out their regulatory missions in a
reactive, rather than proactive, fashion.
The doctrinal underpinning for these restrictions is a perceived
fourth amendment privacy distinction between an individual's
interest in his or her financial information and a corporation's
interest in similar materials. This distinction incorrectly focuses on
the identity of the subpoena target rather than the nature of the
documents. Furthermore, courts have largely ignored their ability to
protect privacy by including redisclosure restrictions in subpoena enforcement orders. The Powell protections and judicious use of confidentiality orders adequately protect individuals from undue invasion

274. 379 U.S. at 57-58.
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of privacy when their financial records are subpoenaed pursuant to an
agency investigation.
A second restriction on administrative subpoena power has
emerged where an agency subpoenas financial information in order to
assess the cost-effectiveness of an enforcement action. This use has
been held impermissible by some courts and subject to heightened
scrutiny by others. Courts have reached these decisions through
narrow statutory construction and analogy to pre-trial discovery
limitations. Analogy to pre-trial discovery, however, is misplaced
because importing the traditional pre-trial discovery prohibition on
assessment of a defendant's financial condition into administrative
subpoena enforcement ignores the larger public interest in efficient
use of agency resources. In addition, statutory grants of investigative
authority should be deemed to include the authority to subpoena
financial information in order to determine cost-effectiveness. This
interpretation reconciles administrative subpoena power with
traditional deference to an agency's power to set an enforcement
agenda. While Congress remains free to proscribe cost-effectiveness
subpoenas explicitly, recognizing that this power reflects an inherently permissible investigative purpose will allow agencies to set
enforcement agendas in an intelligent, efficient manner.
Jack W. CampbellIV*
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